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ABSTRACT
In the United States, sub-national state policies play outsized roles in renewable
energy policy. Vermont is considered a leader in renewable energy transitions,
exemplified by its goal of a 90% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. While
scholars have praised Vermont’s transition policies, few studies analyze it using energy
justice or just transition principles. This is a crucial omission, as justice in energy
transition has both moral and instrumental importance – unjust transitions may thwart
themselves by failing to achieve widespread societal support. I make initial contributions
to this study using original research conducted as a member of an environmental justice
partnership. First, I find that policy ignores the opportunity provided by household
transition benefits to mitigate energy vulnerability, benefitting wealthy property owners
instead. The same policies also appear to impact public energy governance processes,
marginalizing energy vulnerable households. As an alternative, I suggest policy
frameworks which characterize energy a public good. Second, I analyze discourses in
Vermont’s renewable energy planning documents, as well as interview discourses about
Vermont’s renewable energy transition, to study how these policies prevent and/or
encourage just transition politics. I compare these visions against those in just transition
literature, finding marginal overlap. I conclude that Vermont energy transition discourses
largely prevent just transition by assuming a neoclassical economic vision. I suggest just
transition advocates may use of marginal overlap to advance rhetorical claims, but that
further research into what fosters the small number of existing just transition discourses
in Vermont is needed.
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CHAPTER 1: COMPREHENSIVE LITERATURE REVIEW
1.1. Energy Transitions in Context
Climate change’s roots in fossil fuel energy emissions make renewable energy
transitions – intentional political projects to replace such fuels – central to mitigation and
adaptation. Yet this statement ignores important questions of who uses fossil fuel energy,
how, how much, and why. These are questions of how energy entangles with social,
political, and economic structures (equally applicable to renewable energies as well),
which I think are critical to understanding energy transitions. The academic and activist
fields of energy justice and just transitions point out that these are also questions of
fairness. Energy transitions therefore cannot be neat and tidy substitutions, but are instead
complex sociotechnical processes.
Williams and Doyon (2019:144) summarize this perspective with the claim that
there are “normative and instrumental” reasons for justice in energy transitions. Their
normative case refers aligns with the Just Sustainabilities framework, prioritizing social
equality and cooperation alongside environmental wellbeing (e.g. Agyeman 2013;
Agyeman et al. 2016). The norm is premised on an interconnection between society and
nature, including in terms of energy. An example of such interconnection is how in many
parts of the world, heating is necessary to human wellbeing. When dependent on fossil
fuels, heating pollutes the atmosphere with greenhouse gases (GHG) and threatens life
across the planet. From the sustainability framework, it is key to prevent GHG emissions
without denying people the fuels they need to sustain themselves. For instance, raising
the prices of heating fuels to discourage use may force low-income households to go
1

without adequate heating fuel in order to afford other needs (Sovacool and Dworkin
2014).
Williams and Doyon’s instrumental case refers more to social, political, and
economic systems, stating that injustices “erode support” for transitions in general
(2019:144). Recent examples of this include the 2018 Yellow Vest protests in France,
sparked by a fuel tax increase to discourage fossil fuel use (Nature Energy Editorial
Board 2019). In Ecuador, the government’s removal of subsidies for fossil-based cooking
fuel also spurred widespread protests, leading to subsidy reinstatement in 2019 (BBC
News 2019). Each of these upheavals stems from the interconnections between economic
systems that provision energy as a commodity, political systems governing their pricing
and access, and socioeconomic systems which leave the distribution of wealth uneven.
These cases alone demonstrate the importance of justice in climate mitigation
(and adaptation) policy. But they gloss over an important, interrelated point, which is the
interconnection of social hierarchies with these political and economic conditions. For
instance, access to affordable energy varies significantly by race in the United States,
with high prices and precarious access disproportionately affecting people of color
(Finely-Brook and Holloman 2013; Baker 2019). The fields of energy justice and just
transition both address these hierarchies, and are therefore crucial to climate change
politics and policies. But both fields are broad with conflicting positions. In what follows
I argue which positions in each field I find most useful for climate analyzing energy
transition policies. I also discuss overlap between the two fields and suggest how they
can be combined in analysis.
2

1.2. Energy Justice
Energy justice is largely an academic – as opposed to “activist” – field (Heffron
et al. 2015; Jenkins 2018) addressing the social injustices surrounding energy use writ
large. The field also addresses injustices that arise in energy transitions. It has roots in
the environmental justice literature (Jenkins et al. 2016; Jenkins 2018) and therefore
focuses on distributive injustices (e.g. the concentrations of polluting energy production
facilities in areas populated by people of color), procedural injustices (e.g. lack of due
process in energy infrastructure siting), and/or recognition injustices (e.g. utility
companies failing to recognize the electrical needs of at-home medical patients in
developing price models). By the same logic, it also focuses on energy issues faced
disproportionately by the poor, people of color, and women (Sovacool et al. 2016;
Lennon 2016; Baker 2019; Allen et al. 2020).
I find three main principles in the energy justice framework. First, energy and
energy use are key components of livelihood and wellbeing (Sovacool and Dworkin
2014; Day et al. 2016). Energy vulnerability – “problems of access to sufficient and
affordable energy” (Day and Walker 2013:15) – is therefore an injustice because it
interferes with peoples’ ability to meet their needs comfortably. The usual example of
this is fuel poverty, in which poor households spend disproportionate shares of their
money on fuel costs (see for example Walker and Day 2012; Teller-Elsberg et al. 2016;
Reames 2016). Second, social, economic, and political forces combine to produce energy
injustices because energy systems are sociotechnical. This term refers to the fact that the
politics, economics, infrastructure, purposes, uses, and technologies that make the energy
3

system function cannot be meaningfully separated from social questions (Miller et al.
2013). Energy injustices are therefore contingent on political, social, and economic
systems, not the result of chance. Baker (2019) points out how concentrations of energy
extraction, refinement, and pollution in communities of color in the United States is part
of environmental racism and sacrifice zones more broadly (see also Agyeman et al.
2016).
Third, energy transitions must address these interconnections, and policies that
do not are inappropriately technocratic or misguided. Eames and Hunt (2013:49) point
out that energy transitions include “deeply contested technologies and prospective
societal pathways to a range of different low-carbon futures” each with “differing
distribution of socio-economic costs and benefits.” Sovacool and colleagues (2016:311)
similarly remark that energy transitions are “highly confrontational” by default because
they require “alterations at every level of the energy system, in a nearly simultaneous
manner.”
This third tenet contrasts some with the dominant Multi-Level Perspective (MLP)
theories about energy transitions such as “transition management,” and “technological
information systems” (Eames and Hunt 2013; Geels 2005; Geels et al. 2017). These fields
approach transitions less in terms of justice and injustice than of optimality and
effectiveness. While MLP theories share the sociotechnical systems perspective with
energy justice literature, they are somewhat more ambivalent about whether or not justice
arises from energy systems (Eames and Hunt 2013). In such approaches to transition,
energy systems are made up on one level of individual interactions, a second by rules,
4

policies, and available technologies which shape those interactions, and a third by overall
system ‘paradigms,’ which are the prevailing character of the systems themselves (e.g. a
‘fossil fuel’ paradigm vs a ‘renewable energy’ one). The primary objective of ‘Transition
Management’ or ‘Technological Information Systems’ is therefore to tweak rules and
policies on the second level, often using technocratic measures like economic and
behavioral modeling, to change individual behaviors or available technologies in the first.
Once these behaviors change, MLP frameworks contend that the energy systems shift
into new paradigms (Eames and Hunt 2013). Whereas this approach is thought to achieve
energy transitions as efficiently and effectively as possible, energy justice perspectives,
though they may draw on MLP theories, are concerned more with normative outcomes.
Authors in the energy justice field disagree about what measures are necessary to
realize these principles in energy systems and energy transitions. Sovacool and
colleagues (2017:677) provide a consensus definition of energy justice: “a global energy
system that fairly disseminates both the beneﬁts and costs of energy services, and one
that has representative and impartial energy decision-making.” To this, I would add
contributions from the subfield of energy democracy, which Burke and Stephens
(2017:35) define as a process of “democratically restructuring the energy and electricity
sectors through the processes of shifting from fossil-fuel-based systems to renewable
energy systems.” The definition of energy justice thus includes some kind of strong,
egalitarian decision-making institutions (in a related paper, Stephens et al. [2018] cite
Vermont’s Town Energy Committees as localized bodies which can make energy
planning more democratic).
5

A reform-oriented branch of the field advocates for justice through policy
principles, metrics, or criteria for energy decision-makers to consider or weigh. A central
example is Heffron and colleagues’ energy justice metric, which aims to quantify energy
justice to “directly connect with economists” who are “dominant” in energy policy and
decision-making (Heffron et al. 2015:172). Jenkins (2018:120) notes that such an
approach, distinct from “activist” approaches of other fields, lets energy justice scholars
make “signiﬁcant contributions to mainstream policy-making.” By contrast, Lennon
provides a revolutionary approach to energy justice and energy systems, targeting not the
criteria energy decision-maker’s weigh as the causes of injustice but the nature of the
system itself. Lennon, tracing the role of energy and energy systems in slavery in the
United States and the legacy of racism, argues energy injustice comes from the material
of energy systems and energy transformation themselves: “[w]e can talk endlessly about
fossil fuels’ deleterious impacts on communities of color, but the point here is that our
commercialized infrastructure for transforming matter – which includes solar panels on
low income buildings – has always taken shape through structures of meaning and
materiality that deem certain lives expendable” through, among other practices, sacrifice
zones (Lennon 2017:25; see also Mulvaney 2019)
I find Baker’s ‘anti-resilience’ (2019) framework effective in bridging these two
positions. Baker draws from Lennon, claiming energy systems should be analyzed with
the assumption that they fundamentally harm low-income communities and communities
of color (by creating relationships of dependence between these communities and forprofit energy providers, by turning these communities into sacrifice zones for energy
6

extraction or production, through exploitative energy workforce practices, etc.).
However, the framework avoids the dichotomy of ‘reform or revolution.’ Instead, it
draws a distinction between ‘resilient’ policies that address unjust outcomes in the energy
system and transformative policies that disrupt the processes which produce such
outcomes. It assumes the former will “freeze [injustices] in place” (2019:36), while antiresilient, transformative policies will “yiel[d] new possibilities of ownership structures
and relationships to power” (2019:46). Baker provides four guidelines for creating
transformative policies and seizing opportunities for justice in transition: place “people
of color and the poor at the front of the line to benefit” (2019:39), create official processes
for energy policy that “specifically include under represented communities” (2019:43),
“redistribute the economic benefits of the energy system” (2019:44) and reconceptualize
energy “as a commons” (2019:46) rather than a commodity. As an example, energy
policies like net metering, targeted explicitly towards low-income communities and
communities of color, could be anti-resilient by disrupting dependence on for-profit
utilities for energy production and energy access. By contrast, Baker cites the state of
Hawai’i’s renewable portfolio standard as resilient, operating such that that “low-income
communities home to large Native Hawaiian populations and people of color…will once
again be home to new, largescale clean energy plants owned by corporate interests”
(2019:19).
1.3 Just Transitions
Just transition literature, by contrast, is more ‘activist.’ It is at once a mainstream
political concept, an academic field, and a demand of social (and labor) movements
7

(White 2019; Jenkins et al. 2020; Stevis et al. 2020). The concept has much in common
with energy justice, however. Healy and Barry (2017) refer to it as energy justice’s
“politicization.” Like energy justice, just transition has roots in the environmental justice
movement (Farrell 2012), focusing heavily on the distribution of benefits and burdens—
often in economic terms relating to jobs and local economies—which occur as a part of
environmental politics. While the term is most frequently used now in terms of climate
change and energy transitions (Rosemberg 2020), originally it also addressed toxins and
environmental pollution more broadly (White 2019). As opposed to macro-scale
questions of economic ‘health’ or ‘efficiency,’ just transition is focused specifically on
disadvantaged “workers and frontline communities” (Stevis et al. 2020:21). In the most
general terms, just transitions literature calls for special measures to protect people whose
employers will fire them in response to environmental or energy regulations, as well as
local economies underpinned by these employers. As described below, the extent to
which these special measures extend throughout society or across other disadvantaged
groups is debated in the field.
The exact meaning of just transition, however, is contested (Stevis et al. 2020:4).
Perhaps the single unifying principle is the moral commitment to protecting individuals
from market forces. In other words, opposing the principle that individuals meet each
other in the market as equals and that market exchange efficiently optimizes all
individuals’, and therefore society’s, utility (Gowdy 2010). Newell and Mulvaney
(2013:144) characterize this position as a need to “centrally address the key political
economy questions of ‘who wins, who loses, how and why’ as they relate to the existing
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distribution of energy, who lives with the side effects of its sites of extraction, production
and generation, and who will bear the social costs of decarbonizing energy sources and
economies.”
Like energy justice, the just transition advocates split on how to advance their
goals. What I call ‘narrow’ just transition proposals concentrate on preventing or
mitigating distributive conflict in energy transitions. Here, just transition is broadly a way
to overcome the ‘jobs versus environment’ framing (Evans and Phelan 2016). Narrow
just transitions involve proposals for retraining, direct compensation, or other mitigating
measures for workers and frontline communities. Eisenberg (2019:324-328) for example
proposes targeted federal aid packages and calls for long-term engagement of local
economic planning with disadvantaged people. Tcherneva (2018) proposes a US-Federal
Jobs Guarantee program which would place displaced energy workers in new positions
automatically. Rosemberg (2017:8) suggests (among other proposals) active labor
market policies to deliver “employment services and providing information, guidance,
and matching services” to “workers at risk of unemployment.”
I consider these narrow because they are typically targeted programs with
geographic or employment-sector specifications. By contrast, broad approaches to just
transition focus on the political economy and socio-natural relationships as a whole
(Giacomini 2020; Goldtooth 2020). I find general tenets of this perspective include 1)
political economies are unfair, and the distributions of power within them are uneven
(e.g. Newell and Mulvaney 2013); 2) modes of economic production themselves, as
opposed to particular industries alone, are unsustainable and require “proactive
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transformation” (White 2019); and 3) energy and energy systems are core components
of these modes of economic production, and changing them disproportionately harms
disadvantaged people within political economic systems. In this last tenet, the broad
approach to just transition overlaps heavily with energy justice and energy democracy
(Sovacool and Dworkin 2014; Sovacool et al. 2017; Lennon 2017; Baker 2019).
Proposals for broad just transition are usually for radical changes in political,
social, and economic relationships. For instance, Snell (2020:214) calls for “an
interventionist state committed to social partnership and union involvement in the
transition process." The Climate Justice Alliance’s just transition frame is maintains that
“the profit-driven industrial economy rooted in patriarchy and white supremacy is
severely undermining the life support systems of the planet” and accordingly “[w]e must
build visionary economy that is very different than the one we now are in” (Climate
Justice Alliance 2020). Similarly, leaders from the Cooperation Jackson movement
advocate for political changes which “create the conditions for the ecosocialist future we
need” (Akuno 2020:108).
These three examples demonstrate that in terms of policy, broad just transition
advocates often propose vague frameworks. This contrasts with the narrow frame, which
is typically rooted in calls for specific (even if large-scale) government programs (e.g.
the jobs guarantee). The narrow frame has had significant uptake of narrow just transition
proposals in mainstream politics (Jenkins et al. 2020), which I find important but
insufficient. While the narrow field’s attention to distributional conflict is critical, I
believe it inappropriately separates politics, economics, and environmental concerns into
10

problems which can be addressed in isolation. For instance, as Eisenberg (2019:323)
points out, justifications for just transitions for energy workers may raise questions about
just transitions for others: “where workers formed a longstanding dependency
relationship with one industry [e.g. New York City Taxi Drivers]; their industry
performed a quasi-public function; and the public’s failure to act left the workers
vulnerable to an abrupt collapse of their industry, leaving them without meaningful
alternatives.” This speaks to the difficulty of addressing a particular economic sector
without addressing Newell and Mulvaney’s ‘political economy questions.’ Moreover,
addressing one of these three areas in isolation ignores its impact on the others. Proposals
for a job guarantee, for instance, may fail to consider the impact of full employment on
the ecological consequences of economic growth it entails.
The broader just transition field focuses on the interdependence of these factors,
drawing from frameworks in which political, social, and economics are materially
embedded in non-human nature (e.g. Brown 2016) and environmental problems originate
from social inequalities (Bookchin 1980; Salleh 2009). The broad just transition
framework therefore addresses social, political, and economic justice through a political
economy lens. It aligns broadly with Fraser’s Marxian definition of capitalism as an
“institutionalized social order” (Fraser and Jaeggi 2018:166). By this, Fraser means that
economic production depends on not only on labor exploitation also upon social and
natural exploitation (e.g. paid and unpaid gendered labor, racialized expropriation of
labor and land, and the need to pollute and disrupt land for fueling growth and depositing
waste) (Fraser 2014).
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Fraser’s point is not that these relationships are ‘functional’ to capitalism or begin
with capitalism (Fraser and Jaeggi 2018:19). Instead, it is that they are all interconnected
(“imbricated”) with one another. Changes in one or more of these relationships reshape
the others with which they are intertwined (Fraser 2014:68). Accordingly, action towards
‘economic’ justice in energy transitions must necessarily overlap with and work for
justice in other social relationships – race, gender, and environmental. “Workers and
frontline communities” therefore becomes a shorthand for the disadvantaged people in
such relationships.
Importantly, the term “does not mean essentializing workers by overstating their
role or placing them above other alienated and oppressed groups” (Stevis et al. 2020:21).
Instead, support for ‘workers and frontline communities’ implies support for a broad
view of environmental justice (e.g. Sze 2020) recognizing that ‘frontline communities’
(e.g. a coal mining town) are typically low-income and/or communities of color (Farrell
2012; Baker 2019). Further, recognizing that ‘workers’ in low-carbon economies may be
more likely exploited by gender (Pearl-Martinez and Stephens 2016; Littig 2018,
Giacomini 2020). Membership in ‘workers and frontline communities’ is therefore more
about “axes of injustice” (Fraser and Jaeggi 2018:171), themselves bound up with “the
organi[z]ation of and relations at work” (Stevis et al. 2020:22), than specific people or
places.
Just transition perspectives are thus mutli-scalar (Pellow 2017). For instance,
disadvantaged in the transition away from the use of coal would not simply be coal
miners and coal communities but electricity customers who may experience rate
12

increases. The just transition vision is thus akin to Wichterich’s (2015:83) There Are
Many Alternatives (TAMA) framework. Here, people, rather than “wait[ing] for a single
consensus on how to completely transform society” resist and unmake injustices “with
multiple strategies” (Harcourt and Nelson 2015:10) starting from where they are with the
conditions in front of them. The vision of the just transition discourse is thus one of
strengthening political conditions (“enabling space” [Wichterich 2015]) in which theses
‘many alternatives’ can thrive, and one in which ‘workers and frontline communities’
unmake “axes of injustice” by their own initiative (Fraser and Jaeggi 2018:171).
A central example would be Cooperation Jackson’s build-and-fight strategy,
working to ‘build’ or prefigure a just transition through construction of a “solidarity
economy” of worker-owned cooperatives focused on environmental sustainability
(Akuno 2020). Their efforts extend into official politics too, ‘fighting’ at the municipal
level, national and international levels (Akuno 2020:106) for policies which support their
efforts to ‘build.’ The organization’s Just Transition plan, for instance, calls for
“expanded and sustainable public transportation” (Cooperation Jackson 2015)
strengthening the flow of people and goods throughout the solidarity economy (and
beyond) and decreasing fossil fueled transportation emissions.
The end goal of just transition is therefore quite vague. It might be thought of as
a democratized political economy in which people can pose and answer normative
questions about the purpose of their energy and economies: “energy for what? And to
sustain what kinds of modes of life?” (White 2019:14). The upshot should not be that
just transition is ‘unrealistic’ or unwieldy, but that a neat, packaged ‘just transition’
13

policy will be insufficient and overly simplistic. As opposed to targeting particular
economic sectors for relief in energy transitions alone, better approaches would be
targeting specific conditions preventing worker and frontline community initiatives.
These conditions might include proposals under the narrow just transition framework
(for example, a jobs guarantee would alleviate conditions preventing fired energy
workers from finding new jobs) but under a broad transition framework these as are
understood enabling, not causing, larger changes in political economic conditions.
What follows from this overview is that there is much overlap between the energy
justice and just transition fields. An overly simplified distinction between the two would
be that energy justice, with its emphasis on households and energy sufficiency, pertains
to energy use while just transitions, emphasizing political economy, focus on energy
production. The strength of the anti-resilience framework proposed by Baker, and the
broad just transition frameworks laid out by White and Stevis and colleagues, is their
ability to address production and use holistically. The broad just transition frame as I
have described it necessarily includes energy justice perspectives because of its attention
to “axes of injustice” ranging from energy production to consumption. The antiresilience framework also overlaps readily with a build-and-fight strategy from the broad
just transition framework, demonstrated by its proposals for “new possibilities of
ownership structures and relationships to power” (Baker 2019:46) in energy systems.
There is also a slight connection between the MLP framework off of which energy justice
scholars build and the “enabling space” approach to just transitions. In this context,
secondary or ‘regime-level’ policies and rules in the MLP framework are akin to policies
14

providing “enabling space.” Where the just transition framework breaks from MLP is in
MLP’s assumption that the primary or ‘individual-level’ is composed of individual
equals. Just transition, by contrast, sees these individuals organized along axes of
injustice, with social, political, and economic injustices hardwired into the system.
Therefore, like energy justice, just transitions perspectives cannot accept the ambivalent
‘optimality’ focus in some MLP frameworks, but the two share an approach to rules,
policies, and ‘regimes’ governing behavior.
1.4. Energy Justice, Just Transitions, and Policy
Though they address a wide range of relationships beyond formal political ones,
energy justice and just transitions of course concern themselves with content and purposes
of energy transition policies. As discussed above, the criteria on which policymakers make
energy decisions are central to some energy justice scholars. The distributive impacts of
energy policy decisions are also central concerns of the field of just transitions. But the fact
that both fields have roots in environmental justice complicates their relationships to
policymaking and the state in general. Recent papers from Pulido and colleagues (2016)
and Pellow (2017) criticize the state – and therefore policy decisions—as antithetical to
justice. For Pulido and colleagues, this comes from the relative ineffectiveness and lack of
enforcement for environmental justice policy in the United States. For Pellow, it comes
from theoretical works about the state label it inherently unjust and anti-ecological. I find
these claims important, but I break with them slightly. I consider each one to essentialize
states and governments, treating them as unitary actors. Routledge and colleagues present
an alternative framework in which the role of government is contingent and the state is
15

“contested terrain” for justice movements (2018:82). I find this perspective useful in
recognizing the social, political, and economic forces which constrain ‘the state’ (e.g. for
Pulido et al., racial capitalism), but not leaving the power lying in the state and policy to
their control (Cumbers 2015).
Moreover, the urgency of climate mitigation and adaptation poses an instrumental
reason for engaging with the state and policy as a means to coordinate systemic societal
changes. Wichterich makes the point that for equitable political economy and sustainability
in general (and in my reading, climate change mitigation) “a state is needed…[i]t must shift
its focus to fair distribution through regulation and taxation of real and financial markets,
and protection of nature, social reproduction and the public good from subjection to
economization and privatization – thereby enabling spaces for an economy of solidarity, a
change in society–nature relations and for overcoming the production–reproduction divide
and the gender-hierarchical division of labour” (2015:94). Without holding “the state” and
“policy” as interchangeable, and holding Wichterich’s point that such a state may not
currently exist, I understand transition policies as potential tools for building such a state,
and analyze them accordingly.
Academics in both fields have put forth examples of just energy transition policy
inside this contested terrain, including in the US-state of Vermont. Baker (2017:233) cites
community solar policies in Vermont as a “hint” of an energy just system. These policies
allow multiple individuals to own solar arrays collectively, defraying upfront costs to
ownership and spreading benefits of net metering payments among owners. Stephens and
colleagues (2018) also highlight Town Energy Committees (local-level government bodies
16

providing planning and guidance for local energy policies) in Vermont as steps toward
energy justice and energy democracy. On a global level, Jenkins et al. (2020) claim the use
of the term in United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change proceedings,
including the 2015 Paris Agreement, as proof of policy success. In regional terms, Snell
(2020) has described the difficulty of local-level just transition policy in the Latrobe Valley
in Australia, offering instead the example of labor unions’ efforts to broker agreements
between firms to give preference to fired energy workers.
Jenkins et al. (2020) call for just transition scholars to ‘politici[z]e’ their work in
terms of the Nationally Determined Contributions stemming from the 2015 Paris
Agreement. This poses a challenge for scholars studying the United States, the Federal
government of which lacks a comprehensive plan for energy transition (and has sought to
break with the Paris Agreement altogether). In this absence, the energy transition policies
of subnational state governments in the U.S. take on additional importance (Rabe 2019).
Many of these arose before the 2015 Paris Agreement, and therefore their interactions with
energy justice and just transitions, however defined, are uncertain. In what follows, I will
detail a case of Vermont’s energy transition policies, a state considered a leader and a
model for others and therefore influential. In light of Williams and Doyon’s “normative
and instrumental” calls for justice in transitions, I examine the extent to which previous
academic papers have addressed these questions as well, foreshadowing my two research
papers below.

17

1.5 Vermont Transition Policy
The Vermont state government has pursued renewable energy policy for more
than twenty years, which this paper does not exhaustively describe. Instead, I focus on
policies with household-level impacts, a core building block of which is the net metering
program. Starting in 1998, the program mandated that electric utilities pay owners of
‘Certificates of Public Good’—awarded to small-scale renewable electricity producers,
often solar photovoltaic arrays—for electricity generated and distributed on the grid
(Vermont Department of Public Service 2020c). In 2005, the Vermont Legislature
expanded on this with policy incentivizing electric utilities to enter long-term purchasing
contracts with renewable energy producers (DSIRE 2015). More consequential
renewable energy policies emerged in the 2010s, during which the state adopted two
Comprehensive Energy Plans (CEP) which set goals to reduce all non-renewable energy
consumption by 90% by 2050 (VDPS 2016), along with smaller benchmarks along the
way. The Legislature also enacted a Renewable Energy Standard (RES) in 2015,
compelling electric utilities to sell increasing quotas of renewably-produced electricity,
source increasing amounts of electricity from ‘distributed’ (i.e. small scale, Vermontbased) generators, and invest increasing amounts in “energy transformation”
infrastructure (e.g. electric vehicle chargers) (VDPS 2020c).
On top of these electricity policies, the CEPs call for 33% reduction in energy
consumption per capita by 2050 (VDPS 2016:2), implicating the government’s
longstanding thermal efficiency policies in its overall emissions reduction plans
(Clement 2016). A total of 45% of Vermont’s total energy use comes from thermal
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energy, of which 76% is non-renewable. Thermal efficiency efforts therefore play a
significant role in meeting CEP goals (Energy Action Network 2019) Central to these
are those governing “energy efficiency utilities” (EEUs) which, under oversight from the
Public Utilities Commission, provide loans and rebates to consumers for electric and
thermal efficiency upgrades (VDPS 2020a). The Department of Public Service also
sponsors loan programs for low-income households to pursue thermal efficiency
upgrades (VDPS 2016:74-75). Another body, the Department for Children and Families
also implements the Weatherization Assistance Program (WAP) which combines
funding from the Federal Low Income Weatherization Assistance Program and a tax on
heating fuel to provide free weatherization services to low income households (DCF
2020).
Sovacool and colleagues (2014) as well as Stephens and Colleagues (2018) praise
the Vermont government’s participatory processes for developing and managing
renewable energy plans. Central institutions for these tasks include the Public Utilities
Commission, a quasi-judicial body which “supervises the rates, quality of service, and
overall financial management of Vermont's utilities” (Vermont Public Utilities
Commission 2020), and more locally, Town Energy Committees which provide
“democratic space for local conversations about energy planning and energy
innovations…[and] provide input on the state-level conversation about Vermont’s
energy future” (Stephens et al. 2018:7). The Energy Generation Siting Policy
Commission also provided space for public engagement in determining siting procedure
(Sovacool et al. 2014:52), which eventually influenced the Vermont Legislature allowing
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municipal governments to set town-level ‘energy plans’ with local input (Vermont
Legislature 2016). The 2016 CEP also claims “substantial” public involvement in
designing it (VDPS 2016:8), including focus groups and public feedback solicitation
processes.
So far, reports on Vermont policy claim success in emissions reductions: “The
increasing renewability of our electricity sector has brought us very close to achieving
the first CEP milestone — 25% renewable by 2025” (EAN 2019:3). Though these
reductions do include newly constructed generation facilities in Vermont, these
reductions also stem from Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs), which allow the
purchasers like electric utilities to ‘offset’ their carbon emissions by paying producer to
generate renewable electricity elsewhere. They also include electricity purchased largely
from the Canadian generators owned by Hydro-Quebec (EAN 2019:235). How to
advance emissions reductions in the transportation and building heat sectors appear more
difficult, (EAN 2018) and these sectors appear to demonstrate more “lock-in” (UrgeVorsatz et al. 2013). Despite this, academic and non-academic sources consider Vermont
as an overall “leader” in US-State renewable energy transitions (Sovacool et al. 2014;
Levine 2016; Silverman 2017; Glitman 2018; Stephens et al. 2018).
This recognition aside, few studies have addressed Vermont’s energy transition
using justice-based frameworks. Policy evaluations too address the Vermont energy
system at the level of utilities and large-scale renewable generators, as opposed to a focus
on households, ignoring a core area of focus of energy justice, for instance.
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In general, authors have found high energy costs in the state (Mittlefehldt and
Tedford 2014:11) and disproportionate concentration of energy poverty (spending
greater than 10% of monthly income on energy costs) among low-income residents
(Teller-Elsberg et al. 2016:83-87). Still, these studies relate to energy use writ large, but
deal less with energy transition policies. While these papers use energy justice concepts,
to my knowledge, no paper has studied Vermont using a just transition framework. This
absence has motivated the research papers below, which intend to call attention to
prospects for justice and injustice under Vermont’s current frameworks. As this review
of literature has shown, these subjects can be investigated from a variety of frameworks,
themselves full of divisions. What follows is an attempt to draw lessons from a case study
of Vermont particular, but with an eye towards how they may relate more generally to
energy transitions and justice in the United States.
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Abstract:
This study examines relationships between Vermont’s renewable energy policies
and energy vulnerability in the state. Drawing on survey and interview data, we argue that
current policy mechanisms such as incentives for benefits such as solar net metering or
thermal efficiency upgrades accrue to wealthy property owners, as opposed to energy
vulnerable households. These policies incentivize transition benefits through subsidizing
them as investments available to households with capital and property rights. This
incentives mechanism contrasts with energy justice proposals that argue policy should treat
transition benefits as opportunities to mitigate high energy prices and/or thermal
inefficiency energy-vulnerable households. The incentives mechanisms also appear to
impact public process over energy permitting and siting, marginalizing energy vulnerable
households and prioritizing the same beneficiaries. As an alternative that is more likely to
overcome political-economic barriers of property and income distribution, we suggest
policy frameworks that characterize HTB access and energy as a whole as public goods to
which everyone is entitled. We argue such an approach could overcome ownership and
access concerns whereas typical proposals such as on-bill financing cannot.
Keywords: Anti-Resilience, Energy justice, Energy transitions, Vermont
1. Introduction
Replacing energy sources that emit greenhouse gases (GHG) with low- or nocarbon sources is a key climate change mitigation strategy. In the United States (US),
where there is no comprehensive federal policy to reduce GHGs, state-level 1 policies are
1

I use this term to refer to the subnational ‘states’ within the US, not to countries.
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core drivers of energy transitions. Studying state-level renewable energy policies is
especially important because the content of energy transition policy also varies greatly
across energy systems. Williams and Doyon (2019:144-5) note that there are “normative
and instrumental” reasons to center justice in energy transitions because unjust transitions
“erode political support for transition efforts”. The disruptive Yellow Vest protests in
France provide a stark example: an increase in the price of fuel triggered widespread
backlash among disproportionately affected drivers outside of rural areas. In response, after
the French President conceded and suspended the proposed tax (Nossiter 2018). Williams’
and Doyon’s paper extends the work of energy justice scholars emphasizing that how, not
simply whether transitions occur matters in ethical terms too. As energy systems are
fundamentally entangled with social, political, economic, and technical issues, energy
transitions may unjustly harm certain segments of society, frequently low-income
populations and/or people of color. Energy transitions are therefore matters of social justice
(Newell and Mulvaney 2013; Miller and Richter 2014; Sovacool and Dworkin 2014;
Jenkins et al. 2016; Lennon 2017; Eames and Hunt 2017; Geels et al. 2017; Baker 2019;
White 2019). Baker (2020), for instance, describes how Mexico’s climate action agenda
disproportionately concentrated wind energy development in the poor, ethnically diverse
state of Oaxaca without meaningful consultation of residents or equitable distribution of
economic development.
Distribution of energy transition benefits also relates to household-scale concerns.
As Finley-Brook and Holloman (2016:3) note “wealthier populations are more likely to
gain, sometimes at the expense of the poor.” For brevity, we refer to these gains, such as
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residential solar with net-metering (allowing owners to sell electricity ‘back’ to the grid),
or household weatherization (reducing energy expenditure through insulation efficiency),
as household transition benefits (HTBs). The distribution of and access to HTBs is a
question of equity as much as equal distribution as these technologies can reduce household
energy burden (the proportion of spending a household spends on energy costs) which
disproportionately affects people of color and low-income people (Baker 2019).
This paper applies energy justice frameworks to energy transition policies in
Vermont, a U.S. state considered to be a national leader and a model for other states
because of its successes in increasing the consumption of renewably-generated electricity,
investments in electric and thermal efficiency, overall energy renewable energy goals , and
planning processes for renewable energy development (Koliba et al. 2014; Sovacool et al.
2014; Levine 2016; Silverman 2017; Glitman 2018; Stephens et al. 2018). While some
studies have analyzed Vermont’s general transition policies, few have done so using an
explicit justice focus. This paper applies Baker’s “anti-resilience” energy justice
framework to original research data evaluating energy vulnerability as a broader category
of injustice. Using a convergent mixed methods approach (Creswell and Plano Clark 2018),
we analyze surveys, interviews, and government data to ask what injustices arise as a part
of the renewable energy transition in Vermont, and how? Following a results section, we
identify a concentration of energy vulnerability among low-income and non-homeowning
households. Focusing on HTBs, we identify injustices in access to transition benefits such
as solar net metering and energy efficiency upgrades, as well as in participation in energy
decision-making. We conclude by drawing on proposals from Wichterich (2015), White
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(2019), and Stevis and colleagues (2020) that promote justice in transition policy as
“enabling spaces” for bottom up change, as opposed to providing justices itself. We suggest
an alternative policy principle that treats energy as a public good, mitigating access barriers
and encouraging more meaningful participation in energy decisions.

2. Energy Justice, Anti-Resilience and the Vermont Context:
2.1 Energy Justice:
Sovacool and colleagues (2017:677) define energy justice as “a global energy
system that fairly distributes both the benefits and burdens of energy services, and one that
contributes to more representative and inclusive energy decision-making.” While the field
is diverse, it is possible to distinguish three major tenets. The first focuses on the
entanglement of energy production, distribution, and use with social, political, and
economic dynamics (Miller et al. 2013; Sovacool and Dworkin 2014; Heffron et al. 2014;
Jenkins et al. 2016). Often, this tenet includes research focusing on household energy
consumption, relating to the field’s position that energy access is a key aspect of human
wellbeing (Sovacool and Dworkin 2014). Such studies focus frequently on ‘energy
vulnerability’ or “problems of access to sufficient and affordable energy” (Walker and Day
2013:15) among marginalized populations.
The second tenet criticizes technocratic ‘Transition Management’ renewable
energy policies (see Bickerstaff et al. 2013; Eames and Hunt 2013) for ignoring the
confrontational, political nature of energy transitions (Sovacool et al. 2016: 311). These
works question the extent to which renewable energy transitions can occur simply through
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competent ‘management’ of public policy and market dynamics, preferring more explicit
policy criteria that emphasize justice rather than ‘efficiency’ alone (e.g. Heffron et al.
2015). This criticism relates to the third tenet, that there are “normative and instrumental”
reasons for justice in energy transitions (Williams and Doyon 2019). The ‘normative’
reasons stem from both energy justice’s attention to energy and wellbeing, along with an
understanding of environmental sustainability in which social equality plays a core role
(Agyeman 2013). The ‘instrumental’ reasons stem from the idea that injustices weaken
political support for or provoke backlash against transitions. Prime examples are the French
Yellow Vest protests relating to regressive fuel taxes (Nature Energy Editorial Board 2019)
and protests across Ecuador in 2019 in response to the removal of fuel subsidies (BBC
News 2019).
2.2 Anti-resilience
The energy justice field splits, however, on whether to reform or revolutionize
energy systems. Accordingly, proposals for justice in transitions vary. While numerous
scholars propose principles, guidelines, or metrics for policymakers (Heffron et al. 2015;
Sovacool et al. 2017; Jenkins et al. 2018), others reject energy systems themselves—not
simply the policies under which they operate—as unjust (Lennon 2017). Baker’s (2019)
‘anti-resilience’ framework bridges the two positions. Baker argues that energy systems
should be analyzed with the assumption that they fundamentally harm low-income
communities and communities of color by creating relationships of dependence between
these communities and for-profit energy providers, by turning these communities into
sacrifice zones for energy extraction or production, through exploitative energy workforce
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practices and many others. Baker’s anti-resilience framework avoids a dichotomy of
energy system reform versus revolution. Instead, an anti-resilience framework
distinguishes between resilient policies that address unjust outcomes in the energy system
and transformative policies that disrupt the processes which produce such outcomes. This
approach assumes the former will “freeze [injustices] in place” (Baker 2019:36), while
anti-resilient, transformative policies will “yiel[d] new possibilities of ownership structures
and relationships to power” (2019:46).
Baker provides four guidelines for creating transformative policies and seizing
opportunities for justice in energy transition: 1) place “people of color and the poor at the
front of the line to benefit” (2019:39), 2) create official processes for energy policy that
“specifically include under represented communities” (2019:43), 3) “redistribute the
economic benefits of the energy system” (2019:44) and 4) reconceptualize energy “as a
commons” (2019:46) rather than a commodity. As an example, Baker cites the state of
Hawai’i’s renewable portfolio standard as resilient, operating such that that “low-income
communities home to large Native Hawaiian populations and people of color…will once
again be home to new, largescale clean energy plants owned by corporate interests”
(2019:19). In contrast, policies like net metering (an electric utility arrangement allowing
the owners of small-scale electricity generators, frequently solar arrays, to sell electricity
produced to the utility for bill credits) when targeted explicitly to benefit low-income
communities and communities of color, could be anti-resilient by disrupting dependence
on for-profit utilities for energy production and energy access. Overall, Baker’s framework
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is well-suited to analyzing energy transition policy in Vermont because the state has both
net metering and a renewable portfolio standard program.
2.3 Renewable Energy Policy in Vermont
Vermont is a small, sparsely populated state in the northeastern U.S. Though it has
low levels of energy consumption overall (U.S. Energy Information Association 2020), its
cold-weather climate makes thermal heating with biomass and/or fossil fuels highly
important (Mittlefehldt and Tedford 2014; Teller-Elsberg et al. 2016).Vermont generates
99% of its electricity from renewable sources (U.S. EIA 2020), but only 45% of electricity
consumed comes from renewable generation (Energy Action Network 2019). 48% of the
electricity it consumes comes from nuclear generation and 7% from fossil fuels (Energy
Action Network 2019). The success of renewables in the electricity generation sector stems
largely from the Vermont state government’s pursuit of renewable energy policy,
stretching back over twenty years (Clement 2016). Because of our use of the anti-resilience
framework, this paper we focus on policies with household-level benefits, a core building
block of which is the net metering program. Starting in 1998, the program mandated that
electric utilities pay owners of ‘Certificates of Public Good’ —awarded to small-scale
renewable electricity producers—for electricity generated and distributed back to the grid
(Vermont Department of Public Service 2020). In 2005, the Vermont Legislature
incentivized electric utilities to enter long-term purchasing contracts with renewable
energy producers (DSIRE 2015). More consequential renewable energy policies emerged
in the 2010s when the state adopted two Comprehensive Energy Plans (CEP), which aimed
to reduce all non-renewable energy consumption by 90% by 2050 Vermont Department of
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Public Service 2016), with smaller benchmark goals every 5 years. The Legislature also
enacted a Renewable Energy Standard (RES) in 2015, compelling electric utilities to sell
increasing quotas of renewably-produced electricity, to source increasing amounts of
electricity from ‘distributed’ (i.e. small scale, Vermont-based) generators, and to invest in
“energy transformation” infrastructure (e.g. electric vehicle chargers) (Vermont Public
Utility Commission 2020).
The CEPs also implicate the government’s longstanding thermal efficiency policies
in their overall emissions reduction plans, calling for 33% reduction in energy consumption
per capita by 2050 (Clement 2016; VDPS 2016:2). A total of 45% of Vermont’s total
energy use is thermal, of which 76% is non-renewable Energy Action Network 2019)
Thermal efficiency policy mechanisms play a significant role in meeting CEP goals. With
oversight from the Public Utilities Commission, “energy efficiency utilities” (EEUs)
provide loans and rebates to consumers for electric and thermal efficiency upgrades (PUC
2020). The Department of Public Service also sponsors loan programs for low-income
households to pursue thermal efficiency upgrades (VDPS 2016:74-75). The Department
for Children and Families (DCF) also implements the Weatherization Assistance Program
(WAP), which combines funding from the Federal Low Income Weatherization Assistance
Program and a tax on heating fuel to provide free weatherization services to low income
households (DCF 2020).
The Vermont government’s energy decision-making and planning processes have
received praise as open and participatory (Sovacool et al. 2014; Stephens et al. 2018).
Central institutions for these tasks include the Public Utilities Commission, a quasi-judicial
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body that “supervises the rates, quality of service, and overall financial management of
Vermont's utilities” (PUC 2020), and local Town Energy Committees, which provide
“democratic space for local conversations about energy planning and energy
innovations…[and] provide input on the state-level conversation about Vermont’s energy
future” (Stephens et al. 2018:7). The Energy Generation Siting Policy Commission also
provided space for public engagement in determining siting procedure (Sovacool et al.
2014:52), which eventually influenced the Vermont Legislature to allow municipal
governments to create town-level ‘energy plans’ with local input (Vermont State
Legislature 2016). The 2016 CEP also claims “substantial” public involvement in
designing it (VDPS 2016:8), including focus groups and public feedback solicitation
processes.
Many of these policies address the Vermont energy system at the level of utilities
and large-scale renewable generators. Similarly, the CEPs focus on business and industrial
energy use, which constitute large portions Vermont’s total energy footprint. Policy goals
for per capita reductions, however, implicate households as well. Since households are
frequently the level at which energy justice studies address impacts, this research is most
concerned with Vermont’s household-level transition policies regarding incentives for
small-scale net metering projects as well as energy efficiency upgrades. These incentives
provide significant benefits for households that can access them: 1) lower energy costs (or
in the case of net metering, negative costs), 2) Renewable Energy Certificates, which
households can use to secure higher net metering rates or sell in external markets, and 3)
potential property value increases from efficiency upgrades. These policies also indirectly
31

facilitate access to U.S.-Federal property tax credits by ‘sweetening the deal’ with
additional incentives (DSIRE 2020). Following Baker (2019:27), they could also provide
“opportunities” for anti-resilient energy policies.
Despite these hopeful possibilities, few studies have addressed energy justice issues
in Vermont. In general, scholars have found high energy costs in the state (Mittlefehldt and
Tedford 2014:11) and disproportionate concentration of energy poverty (spending greater
than 10% of monthly income on energy costs) among low-income residents (Teller-Elsberg
et al. 2016:83-87). Studies thus far relate to energy use writ large, rather than the impacts
of energy transition policies. In examining what and how injustices arise as a part of
Vermont’s energy transition, this paper analyzes Vermont’s transition policies with
original survey, interview data, and supplementary public data about HTBs against the
principles laid out in the anti-resilience framework. Our analysis centers Baker’s
assumption that the energy system inherently creates injustice, supported by the few energy
justice studies that have looked at Vermont’s energy system and transition.
3. Methods
Energy justice, rooted in "human centered" research methods (Sovacool 2014:11),
as well as the distributive, procedural, and recognition-based justice paradigms (Jenkins et
al. 2016) implies a mixed methods approach. Studies frequently combine quantitative data
(e.g. distributive inequities) with interpretive qualitative explanations (see Lennon 2016).
This study uses mixed methods for convergent design (Creswell and Plano Clark 2018:192)
for the purposes of comparing results from interviews, surveys, and public data. It aims to
produce facts through simple statistical analysis (for identifying larger trends in survey
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data) and heavy reliance on interpretative methods for providing details and constructing
causal processes from coding interview transcripts. The convergences across these datasets
are described by the headings in section 4. All study protocols in this study were approved
by the University of Vermont Institutional Review Board.
Surveys and interviews were gathered between 2019 and 2020 as a part of the Rural
Environmental Justice Opportunities Informed by Community Expertise (REJOICE)
Partnership. REJOICE is a Vermont-based collaboration between the Center for Whole
Communities, Community Action Works, scholars from the University of Vermont
(including ourselves), and members of the Environmental Justice Clinic at Vermont Law
School. The primary goal of the partnership is to address the question: what does
environmental justice look like in Vermont? Although the findings and analysis of this
paper stem from this dataset, they represent the work and opinions of the paper authors,
not official positions of the REJOICE Partnership. While surveys and interviews examined
environmental justice issues in general, questions on energy and energy transitions were
one of the core topics.
3.1 Survey Design, Sampling/Recruitment and Analysis
This study utilizes interviews, surveys, and supplementary public data to explore
energy vulnerability and energy transition policies. Surveys and interviews were conducted
between 2019 and 2020 as a part of a coalition between academic and community
organization partners. While surveys and interviews examined environmental justice issues
in general, questions on energy and energy transitions were also core topics. The research
team developed an in-person survey (with an online option) consisting of 58 questions
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broken into the following categories: place connections (including local environmental
risks and social concerns); water and climate change; housing (including indoor
environmental risks); energy supply; food security; transportation; health; Vermont lakes
and forests (outdoor recreation); safety (including sense of place); agriculture concerns;
and demographic questions. All questions were optional and not all questions were relevant
to all respondents. Agricultural questions, for instance, were only asked if the respondent
indicated they worked in agriculture, as these questions pertained mainly to on-the-job
environmental health risks. The survey included questions about race, gender, and income.
Questions about race and gender were open-ended (e.g. “what is the best description of
your gender?”). Because of speculation that respondents would not want to indicate their
exact income categories, the survey asked whether a respondent’s household income was
greater than or less than $25,750 per year, based on the Department of Health and Human
Services’ 2019 poverty guidelines for a four-person household (HHS, 2020). Following
data collection, the research team analyzed relationships between variables using chi
square association tests and binary logistic regression tests.
The research team recruited survey participants by going door-to-door in selected
sites (n=463). This process also included an online version of the survey, distributed
through a flyer posted at unanswered doors, as well as at local message boards (n=108).
The research team selected study sites using publicly available data, the full details of
which are discussed in Panikkar and colleagues (forthcoming). Using ArcGIS Pro (ESRI),
researchers overlaid data on social, environmental, and health risks by town boundaries in
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Vermont. 2 Z scores were used to normalize these data and compare them across towns.
The study team awarded each town one point for each variable of which the z score was
above or below a rough cutoff point. While these datasets and ranking criteria are
imperfect, they were intended to identify areas for further investigation (i.e. surveys and
interviews), rather than to develop a robust statistical scoring model. Following this
process, selected towns included Bennington, Barre, Burlington, Rutland, Winooski, and
those in Northeast Kingdom area in the northeastern part of the state.
3.2 Interviews and Analysis
In each of these places, researchers conducted semi-structured interviews with local
social, environmental, and health experts (n=50). This paper draws from 18 transcripts in
which energy was a focus. Interviewees were recruited using internet searches for
organizations in the area, REJOICE partners’ professional networks, and from snowball
sampling (Heckathorn 1997). Identities have been kept confidential, but respondents
included state officials, community association members, homeowners association
members, and policy advocates.
This research uses methods from grounded theory (Strauss 1987) – an inductive
research process in which the “flow of work” is circular (Strauss and Corbin 1998, 29), and
data is revisited iteratively. This approach allowed authors to build on previous work and
apply new questions to pre-existing data. It also lent itself to this dataset’s mixed methods,
These included the percent of the population which is people of color, the average per capita income, the
National Air Toxics Assessment Respiratory Hazards Index Percentile, the percent of the state’s brownfield
sites contained, the percent of the state’s High Priority Hazardous Sites contained, the percent of the state’s
conventional farms contained, the ‘energy burden’ (defined as percentage of total expenditure spent on
energy household energy costs), whether town boundaries overlapped with United States Department of
Agriculture-defined Food Deserts, and whether town boundaries overlapped with Federal Emergency
Management Agency Special Flood Hazard Areas.

2
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focusing on the “interplay” (Strauss and Corbin 1998, 31) between qualitative coding and
quantitative data.
The research team analyzed interview transcripts using thematic analysis (Braun
and Clarke 2006) and Nvivo 12 software (QSR International). A priori codes were
developed from the basic REJOICE research areas (e.g. Agriculture/Farming, Climate,
Definition of Environmental Justice, Economy, Energy, Food, Health, Housing, Nature
Access, Place, Pollution, Transportation, Water, etc.) to divide interview contents by topic.
Following categorization, we developed inductive subcodes (Maguire and Delahunt 2017)
for texts relating to energy transitions. We then compared separate discussions of energy
vulnerability and energy policy across transcripts, seeking to identify patterns. These
themes and patterns were then compared to quantitative findings from REJOICE, ACS,
and VCED analysis.
3.3 Limits and Supplementary data
These datasets posed two main challenges. First, they treat energy vulnerability and
renewable energy concerns as one issue area among many, and do not provide as in-depth
of a perspective as a more specific study might. The authors maintain that its energy
questions provide useful starting points for analyzing energy injustices in Vermont, for
which there is little previous data. Moreover, it presents a large sample size. Second, the
energy-related research questions were included as only one of many topics under analysis,
due to the priorities and needs of the coalition of academics and community organizations
supporting this work. We therefore use convergent design (Creswell and Plano Clark
2018), identifying convergences between interview themes and codes with associations
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between survey and supplementary variables. In terms of supplementary data, we examined
energy vulnerability and renewable energy policies in greater depth using publiclyavailable American Community Survey (ACS) datasets (2017) showing median home
value and average household income by Census Block Group and by town boundary. We
also analyzed Vermont Community Energy Dashboard (VCED) data on the locations of
solar electricity sites with Certificates of Public Good authorizing residential net metering.
From the VCED Community Progress Maps, we constructed a dataset using the ‘number
of housing units comprehensively weatherized’ metric by town.
These additional pieces of data provided insight into the distribution of HTBs along
demographic lines for comparison with interview and survey claims. They provided more
specific information about the distribution of benefits and burdens in the energy transition,
questions of which arose after the design of survey and interview materials. ArcGIS Pro
(ESRI) was used to join VCED location data to ACS Census Block Group boundaries.
Pearson’s correlation tests were conducted in SPSS 12 (IBM) between numerical variables
in ACS17 and VCED data. We then compared these insights with the energy justice and
just transition literatures, especially Baker’s normative claim that those experiencing
vulnerability or injustice should be ‘at the front of the line to benefit’ from policy.
3.4 Author Positionalities and Interpretation
We hold that our positionalities are influential components of research design and
interpretation (Haraway 1988). The authors have a range of positionalities in terms of race,
gender, and wealth, but we share a position as academic researchers. This position, and its
similarity to other issue experts in the REJOICE Partnership, steered topics of
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investigation, research questions, and recruitment scripts towards environmental justice
issues which we assumed, based on our familiarity with the field, may occur in Vermont.
These assumptions may have unintentionally pulled our attention away from atypical
concerns, leaving them undetected by our research tools. Similarly, the materials and
manners used to recruit participants may have biased responses towards people
comfortable with our positionalities and marginalized others. This question is explored
further under section 4.1, however, we did not ask respondents about motivations for
participation, preventing more detailed analysis.
As the first author conducted bulk of data interpretation his positionality deserves
specific attention. Salient positions include his gender, his two-year residency in Vermont,
his whiteness, and his position of financial security. These contrast with traditional
positionalities in which people experience environmental and energy injustices, distancing
this author from topics at hand. Perhaps this contributed to the emergence of broad,
economic categories as key variables in analysis, as opposed to variables which would be
more specifically intersectional. For this reason, we maintain that selected variables are
important but incomplete, areas of consideration for energy justice in Vermont (see Section
4.1).
4. Results and Discussion
This section moves through Baker’s four guidelines for anti-resilient energy policy:
place energy vulnerable people “at the front of the line to benefit” (2019:39); create official
processes for energy policy that “specifically include under represented communities”
(2019:43); “redistribute the economic benefits of the energy system” (2019:44) and
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reconceptualize energy “as a commons” (2019:46). Results show that energy vulnerability
in Vermont is characterized (partially) by income and housing tenure, and that the benefits
of the energy transition appear to accrue to wealthy homeowners over low-income renters.
Results also show that official processes privilege the same groups, marginalizing energy
vulnerable households. In discussing these issues, this paper proposes an alternative
approach to energy “as a commons” – energy as a public good.
4.1 Systemic energy vulnerability among low-income and non-owning households
In identifying energy vulnerabilities and injustices present already in the state,
interview transcripts revealed a clear pattern describing how low-income households
cannot sufficiently access heating or electricity due to costs:
[F]ield directors [in Department of Health offices] get a small sum of
[emergency support] money…for people who have used all the resources
out there but are still having the [monetary] gap with fuel, with electric…
and we went through that money this year…by December [three months
before the end of winter]…do I see that there is a gap? Yes, totally.
(Interview 1)
[D]efinitely people go cold. Turn the thermostat down as low as you
possibly turn the thermostat down and try to conserve when you're
responsible for paying that bill. Electric costs in the state of Vermont are
horrifying. When I moved here…I was shocked by my electric bill.
(Interview 3)
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Survey data show similar results: more respondents below the poverty cutoff
reported general trouble accessing sufficient heating, electricity, and temperature control
than those above. Binary logistic regression showed respondents below the poverty cutoff
were approximately three times as likely to report trouble accessing each of these compared
with respondents above (see Table 1). More respondents that did not own their homes also
reported general trouble accessing sufficient heating, electricity, and temperature control
than owning respondents. While binary logistic regression showed non-owning
respondents were three times as likely to report going without heating, these respondents
were only slightly more likely to report trouble heating or cooling homes or trouble meeting
electric expenses. Notably, chi square tests showed insignificant relationships between
each of these demographic variables and trouble meeting heating expenses, however,
Teller-Elsberg and colleagues’ (2016) findings as well as interview transcripts contradict
this lack of association.
Grounded in this data, lack of household income and lack of property ownership
arise as critical social positions through which people experience energy vulnerability –
and thus injustice-- in Vermont’s energy system. These echo tenets from the broader energy
justice literature. Electricity and thermal energy have become fundamental to wellbeing
(Sovacool and Dworkin 2014), requiring a baseline of consumption by practically every
household in the state. Since they are sold as commodities, however, access to these
baseline resources is partially a function of income. Complicating this access is a lack of
control over household environments. Renting property denies tenants significant control
over the environments in which they live, as the property is not theirs to change. This
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control dynamic may significantly impact decisions about insulation, for instance, resulting
in “split incentives” between landlords and tenants (Bird and Hernandez 2012).
While this paper focuses on these two categories, they are necessarily incomplete,
particularly with respect to vulnerability based on race and gender. Survey results did show
additional energy vulnerability based on race -- 35% of non-white participants indicated
they had gone without heat in the past year, compared to 7% of white respondents
(p=0.000). While this association is statistically significant and consistent with energy
justice literature about the United States in general, (Finely-Brook and Holloman 2016;
Lennon 2017; Baker 2019), the research team determined it is based on too low a sample
size (17 respondents) to draw larger conclusions. By contrast, crosstabulation showed
insignificant relationships between gender and energy vulnerability, breaking with general
energy justice literature (see Sovacool and Dworkin 2014; Day et al. 2016; Teller-Elsberg
et al. 2016; Allen et al. 2020). Interview excerpts similarly did not address race or gender
with reference to energy vulnerability. Yet the significance of race and gender in the energy
justice literature leads us to believe that these findings are products research design, rather
than confirmations of either category being insignificant.
Low sample sizes and insignificant associations in particular could be products of
survey recruitment. While researchers conducted surveys intentionally where Census data
showed higher-than-average numbers of people of color, the team did not use more
intensive approaches to recruiting racially diverse respondents. Researchers also failed to
use gender-disaggregated research methods (e.g. Vijaya et al. 2014) that could better
capture varied experiences by gender. This dataset thus captures certain aspects of energy
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vulnerability, but may misrepresent or obscure “the interests of women and other
‘invisible’ groups” (Rocheleau 1995:461). More intensive research focusing on race and
gender is needed to evaluate these dimensions of energy injustice in Vermont as well as to
conduct a more complete analysis grounded in anti-resilience. Such an analysis would also
be important because race and gender may have significant relationships themselves with
household income and property ownership, adding complexity to understanding energy
vulnerability overall.
Table 1: Energy Transition Questions by Household Income Responses

Gone without heat in the
past year

Above $25,750
n (rounded %)

Below $25,750
n (rounded %)

OR (CI)

5 (5%)

12 (19%)

3.621 (1.211-10.831)

Chi square association p= 0.016

Trouble heating or cooling
home

39 (22%)

Trouble meeting expenses
for electricity

15 (7%)

Have Solar panels

Home has been
weatherized
Know how household fits
into local, regional, or
statewide energy plans
Want to change energy
source(s) for home

52 (45%)

2.937 (1.765-4.890)

Chi square association p= 0.000
28 (21%)

3.461 (1.769 – 6.774)

Chi square association p= 0.000
11(6%)
7 (5.83)

1.031 (0.388-2.736)

Chi square association p= 0.952 (insig)
116 (59%)
55 (48%)

0.648 (0.408-1.029)

Chi square association p= 0.065 (insig)
21 (11%)
8 (7%)
Chi square association p=0.312 (insig)
91 (48%)
40 (37%)
Chi square association p=0.080 (insig)
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0.646 (0.276-1.515)

1.540 (0.949-2.498)

Table 2: Energy Transition Questions by Home Ownership Responses

Gone without heat in the
past year
Trouble heating or
cooling home
Trouble meeting expenses
for electricity
Have solar panels
Home has been
weatherized
Know how household fits
into local, regional, or
statewide energy plans
Want to change energy
source(s) for home

Own
n (rounded %)
5 (5%)

Don’t own
n (rounded %)
11 (16%)

OR (CI)
3.431 (1.134-10.373)

Chi square association p= 0.022
50 (26%)
59 (38%)

0.577 (0.365-0.912)

Chi square association p= 0.018
19 (9%)
26 (15%)

0.548 (0.292-1.028)

Chi square association p=0.058 (insig)
26 (13%)
7 (4%)

3.255 (1.375-7.707)

Chi square association p= 0.005
125 (61%)
72 (45%)
(0.002)
(0.002)
Chi square association p= 0.002
28 (14%)
11 (7%)
Chi square association p=0.036
104 (51%)
53 (36%)
Chi square association p=0.003

1.931 (1.271-2.936)
0.464 (.223-.964)

0.520 (.337-.803)

4.2 Exclusion from transition benefits
After characterization of vulnerability, the anti-resilience framework calls for
groups facing energy injustices to be ‘at the front of the line to benefit.’ Following Baker
(2019:27-33), this paper treats ownership of solar panels or participation in community
solar arrangements (for the purposes of net metering, tax credits, and generating RECs) as
a core transition benefits for their potential to lower bills and reduce dependence on unjust
systems for energy provision. In Vermont, comprehensive weatherization fits in the same
category by decreasing emissions, lowering bills and reducing dependence on fuel markets
(VDPS 2016:49; VDCF 2020). For ease of analysis, the discussion groups solar netmetering, community solar, and comprehensive weatherization into one category:
‘household-level transition benefits’ (HTBs).
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Interview quotes describe the distribution of HTBs going in the opposite direction
Baker demands, citing cost and ownership concerns as significant barriers to
weatherization and solar access:
“[I]f you own, solar might be an option. But as a renter, solar’s not….solar
installation is extremely expensive. Personally, I looked into having solar
installed in our home and the cost was very high. And based on our usage,
which isn’t astronomical, with the amount of panels they could get on my
roof, I would still not eliminate my electric bill.” (Interview 3)
“There’s great weatherization programs if you’re low income and you’re
able to own your house, but if you are low income and you live in a rental
unit and your landlord doesn’t want to and your stuck with the utility bill,
there’s not much that can happen for you…If you’re moderate income and
you maybe don’t have enough to invest in your house, even though it will
save you money down the road…maybe you have a ding in your credit
report so you can’t get a low interest loan to do some of these improvements,
you’re stuck, and you can’t get any access.” (Interview 5)
Survey questions addressed HTBs in more general terms (i.e. “solar” as opposed to
“net-metered” “weatherized” as opposed to “comprehensively weatherized”), but the data
paint a similar picture. Associations between respondents indicating they owned their
homes and those claiming access to ‘solar’ and ‘weatherization’ were both statistically
significant. Binary logistic regression showed owning respondents were approximately
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three times as likely to have solar panels and two times as likely to report their home had
been weatherized.
Comparative data from ACS 17 and VCED also suggest income is a significant
factor for accessing solar net-metering. Pearson’s correlation tests show a strong positive
correlation between Census Block Groups’ median household income and the number of
residential net-metering Certificates of Public Good issued (Pearson’s correlation
coefficient: 0.588). Pearson’s correlation tests on VCED data showed insignificant
associations between town household income, housing value, and the number of
comprehensive weatherizations performed (excluding no-cost weatherizations performed
as a part of the Weatherization Assistance Program). These tests did not compare VCED
data against homeownership statistics because this information was not available by
Census Block Group.
The interplay between qualitative and quantitative data is contradictory in this
instance, as interview responses strongly suggest income plays a significant role in
accessing HTBs, alongside ownership. While statistical tests seem to only confirm the
importance of ownership for both net metering access and weatherization, testing on VCED
data only confirms the role of income in accessing residential net metering. Either way, the
data suggest that policies fail to prioritize low-income and non-owning households in
distributing HTBs, which the anti-resilience framework would require. Results rather
indicate that Vermont’s transition policies have largely ignored HTBs as opportunities for
mitigating energy vulnerability, and there is initial evidence that HTBs have largely
benefited high-income property owners instead.
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4.3 Exclusion from transition knowledge and energy governance
Recent environmental justice literature, from which energy justice literature draws
heavily (Jenkins et al. 2016) has cast doubt on the “distributive paradigm”— emphasis on
the distribution of benefits and burdens that ignores “the power structures and social
systems that give rise to…inequalities to begin with as a way to examine such structures
and systems” (Pellow 2017:21). Instead, scholars call for procedural justice as a lens
through which to see these ‘structures and systems’, which Baker’s prerequisite for
“democratic participation in energy project decision-making” (2019:19) echoes. This
analysis therefore turns to what sorts of procedural conflicts emerged from interview
transcripts.
In general, respondents described energy decision-making (e.g. Public Utilities
Commission or Town Energy Committee meetings) as unfair. They described, usually with
respect to wind or solar siting, a procedural bias in which another participant or group of
participants’ wealth outweighed their own concerns or those they were sympathetic to:
“one of the most controversial projects here…was a small community solar
project…there were a couple of really nice houses from people that have
lived there for a really long time [opposing the solar] that felt like…they
would see the solar. …everyone's always afraid that it's going to ruin their
view, and it's going to be insurmountably ruining their property values”
(Interview 7)
This dynamic extended beyond HTBs like community solar and into larger
scale renewable infrastructure development:
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“[solar developers] bought a piece of land next to [our homeowner’s
association] to build the solar fields…and would expose us to the wind and
to the noise and it would make poor visibility…We’re not against
solar…we’re against where they’re wanting to put it. There are places to put
it where it’s not an eyesore…[but] I mean they got the big bucks, they’re
Manhattan lawyers, you know…they gave the town $200,000 to try to put
it there…” (Interview 6)
At first blush, each of these participants reported classic procedural justice issues
in which government bodies fail to be neutral fora for environmental decision-making
(Ventriss and Kuentzel 2006; Pulido et al. 2016; Pellow 2017). While these dynamics are
cause for concern, survey data describing knowledge of the energy transition and
willingness to participate in it reveal a larger procedural concern: general lack of
engagement.
Out of all survey respondents, 90% reported they did not know how their household
“fit into local, regional or statewide energy plans,” including 93% of non-owners. This
finding is striking considering the Comprehensive Energy Plan calls for per-capita
reduction in energy use, as well as “substantial” public involvement in designing the most
recent plan itself (VDPS 2016:8). In percentages, twice as many property owners reported
knowledge of how their household fit into the energy transition, and a majority claimed to
want to change at least one energy source for their homes as opposed to approximately a
third of non-owning respondents. However, associations between these survey questions
and household income were statistically insignificant.
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4.4 Investment Inequality and Resilient Energy Injustice
That few people have in-depth knowledge of Vermont’s energy transition policy
suggests few people meaningfully participate. Despite the importance of procedural justice
analysis, these low numbers weaken the potential for revealing more complicated structural
or systemic injustices through attention to procedure alone. Questions arise as to why few
people participate in public processes in the first place as opposed to what injustices arise
in the participation process. The quotes in section 3.3 illustrate that concerns over
enjoyment of place and aesthetics (‘eyesores’) were central reasons for participating in
energy decision-making. Ostensibly non-owners and owners alike could share these
concerns, but owners alone have the concern of enjoyment and aesthetics’ effects on
property value. The desire to maintain or increase this value gives owners special reason
to participate in energy decision-making and may also provide them greater standing
through legal appeals to these rights. Viewed in this light, property owner interests and
debates over property value concerns dominate energy governance discussion. Energy
vulnerable households (including renters, the poor), many of which my findings suggest
have no such property value to maintain and no such standing to which to appeal, are
therefore marginalized.
The importance of holding investments (i.e. property) in participation can also
explain unequal distribution of HTBs. As mentioned in section 1.2, to the extent that they
address energy at the household level, Vermont’s transition policies focus on creating
‘yields’ (e.g. tax credits; electricity price guarantees; access to markets for RECs; increased
home value from efficiency upgrades). Rather than tools for remedying energy
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vulnerability as proposed by Baker, this approach turns HTBs into investments. In this
form HTBs become available only to those with appropriate investment capital – both
disposable income and property—which my findings show many energy vulnerable
households lack. Incentives-based policies appear to have ignored energy vulnerability
while benefiting property owners and those with large disposable incomes instead. Having
low household income, as well as not owning property, are thus simultaneously positions
through which Vermonters experience energy vulnerability as well as structural barriers to
participating in the renewable energy transition which could mitigate it. In general,
investment-focused policies make the unjust energy system more resilient by failing to use
“energy policy as an equity based tool of empowerment and system transformation”
(2019:24).
This analysis, and Baker’s framework, amount to normative critiques about who is
most deserving of transition benefits. But policymakers, including one interviewee,
question the importance of increasing HTB access on instrumental grounds:
Should [we] just make it so low-income people can put solar on their
homes?... [t]hat's a very expensive way to get more renewable energy. And
what is your goal? To lower their costs of energy or…to put solar on their
homes? Because if the goal is to lower their cost of electricity, there's [sic]
better ways of doing that. I think in Vermont where we have some utilities
that are at a hundred percent renewable…you're not like offsetting coal
power [through net metering], you're potentially just slowing the progress
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to a hundred percent renewables because of the cost is so much higher
(Interview 4)
Though this perspective may further strengthen the normative critique
(household net metering is perhaps an unnecessary approach to meeting emissions
targets, one that policy has deployed to benefit primarily wealthy property owners),
it casts significant doubt on whether widespread access to solar is instrumental.
Modeling to determine the validity of this claim is beyond the scope of this paper,
but in terms of emissions targets alone, perhaps universal net metering is not.
Yet universal, or at least widespread, home weatherization may still prove
critical. It is especially unclear how to achieve per-capita energy reductions (EAN
2018; VDPS 2016:8) without such widespread thermal efficiency measures.
Currently, the necessary weatherization for emissions reduction comes from either
out-of-pocket payments, subsidized loan or rebate programs (Efficiency Vermont
2020) or the state’s Weatherization Assistance Program. The first two reproduce
the HTB-as-investment model, while the funding model of the third would take
“more than 50 years to completely weatherize the homes of its targeted low-income
population [alone]” (VDPS 2016:95). Interview respondents also confirm it has
insufficient capacity compared to need:
“There’s [sic] more people that apply each year than we have funding to
serve…it’s purely funding” (Interview 2)
For both normative and instrumental reasons, then, there appear to be deficiencies
of energy justice measures in Vermont’s renewable energy policy. Baker gives two
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proposals for anti-resilience policy which could address these shortcomings: centralization
of concerns of people of color and the poor in energy planning and policy; and equitable
redirection of transition benefits towards these communities (2019:38,47). As a start,
energy governance could require representation of (and ideally compensation for) lowincome and non-owning residents in bodies such as Town Energy Committees, (see
Stephens et al. 2018). Similarly, the Department of Public Service could consider changes
to its net metering incentives to favor or require community solar development with group
net-metering in low-income communities.
5. Conclusions and Policy Implications
This study has made initial investigations into the relationships between Vermont’s
renewable energy policies and energy vulnerability in Vermont. Seen through survey and
interview data, it finds that current policy mechanisms primarily benefit wealthy property
owners and ignore the opportunity provided by household transition benefits to mitigate
household energy injustice. The incentives-based policies which provision HTBs also
impact public energy governance processes, marginalizing energy vulnerable households
and prioritizing the wealthy beneficiaries.
Energy analysts in Vermont have previously identified uneven distribution of HTB
access but without attention to these structural roots (VDPS 2016; Schute et al. 2018; Levin
et al. 2019). Similar to the criticism of the ‘distributive paradigm,’ (Pellow 2017:21) these
works argue the problem lies in HTB distribution mechanisms (e.g. market failure), rather
than in the structures in which distribution occurs. Common policy responses are ‘creative’
finance options, such as subsidized loans for weatherization; ‘on-bill financing’ in which
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utilities provide loans for efficiency upgrades to service accounts (as opposed to
individuals); and community solar or group net metering, which allow multiple households
to own shares of net metered solar systems and split the benefits (VDPS 2016; Schute et
al. 2018; see also EAN 2019).
Yet interview transcripts cast doubt on ‘creative’ loans, for instance, questioning
whether they meaningfully overcome upfront costs:
“most of those programs are…sort of enhanced loan programs, and
[especially] for people who are already fully leveraged, a loan -- even if it's
a 0% loan, even if it pays itself back from heating costs eventually -- it's all
late gratification and it's just not tempting enough for a lot of people.”
(Interview 7)
Property ownership more severely constrains loan programs. On its face, on-bill
financing can lessen ‘split’ incentives for weatherization, in which renters would benefit
directly but landlords, responsible for such a property investment, would not. Even when
on-bill financing can provide funds without charging landlords and without forcing renters
to take on debt, the terms require cooperation between tenants and landlords (Bird and
Hernandez 2012) leaving the final decision with the property owner. Community solar and
group net metering are also frequent proposals for arrangements which allow non-owning
households to access the solar (Fuller 2008; Schute et al. 2018; Stephens et al. 2018). But
as described in the interview excerpt above, these projects face constraints from to nearby
property owners’ claims to nearby property value, even if they are incentivized by policy.
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Similar issues may hamper attempts to increase public participation in energy
decision-making. As motivation to participate is associated with concerns over property
value, efforts to increase public energy participation (hearings, participatory planning, etc.)
may simply attract previously unaware wealthy property owners without motivating energy
vulnerable households. Should people facing energy vulnerability nonetheless participate,
they may still face marginalization by not having equal stake as participants with claims
on property and property value.
This analysis therefore suggests that unequal distribution of HTBs appears to have
roots not in the effectiveness of market mechanisms or access to finance but in the unequal
distribution of property and income, placing firm ceilings on the potential for equitable
distribution. The same distributions of property and income appear to also condition
meaningful participation in energy governance. It follows that absent their complete
removal, disparities in property and income will shape not only energy vulnerability but
inequality in HTB access and uneven participation in energy governance.
To overcome these structures, policy frameworks could provision HTBs and energy
more generally as public goods – those to which all citizens have access or are entitled –
rather than as commodities or investments. One such approach would be for the state
government to take public ownership of electric utilities. While public ownership would
give “no guarantees” of more just outcomes (Burke and Stephens 2017:41), carefully
designed ownership could still provide all ratepaying households – as partial owners– with
official stake in energy decision-making, countering the dominance of property owners.
Public ownership could also remove the profit motive from electricity provision (see Bird
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and Hernandez 2012), creating opportunities to provide electricity cheaply (or freely) to
each household, or greater incentives for the utilities to invest in electric efficiency
(Bozuwa 2018; Koeppel et al. 2019). Extending a public goods approach to weatherization
also holds promise. Recharacterizing weatherization as a public good to which all
households have a right could work to universalize the Weatherization Assistance Program,
thereby providing weatherization freely to all households and overcoming split incentives
in the process.
At a conceptual level, using “public power” (Fraser 2014:58) to reconceptualize
energy and transition benefits into public goods provides at least nominal common
ownership of energy systems. Accordingly, it may provide greater procedural standing for
energy justice advocates to address the structural energy processes at root in energy
injustice. It also may assist in aggregating and coordinating private consumption patterns
in a more egalitarian manner than incentives-based approaches. Taking the statewide
jurisdiction of Vermont policy as a given, we would recommend a statewide (as opposed
to local) institutions govern these public goods. While this structure may diminish some of
the relational strengths of small-scale energy cooperatives (Burke and Stephens 2017), it
could mitigate inequitable sourcing and allocation of funding which might arise from
localized management systems and perhaps still accommodate localized decision-making.
Of course, the political feasibility of such proposals is questionable. Bird and
Herndandez (2012) characterizes such efforts as “expensive and unrealistic.” Snell
(2020:214) argues such proposals would depend on “an [economically] interventionist

54

state committed to social partnership,” by no means a guarantee, particularly in a small
US-state like Vermont.
In instrumental terms, however, particularly with respect to household
weatherization, policy must overcome, not simply lower, structural barriers to universal or
near universal access to meet its goals. The question of how to build political support and
power for such proposals is therefore key. New contributions to the just transition
framework, a close relative to energy justice (Healy and Barry 2017) call for justice as a
process, not as a singular policy. Stevis et al. (2020:22-23) describe a need for
“environmental debate,” building popular support for things like ‘renewable energy
transitions’ through imagining a “broader and deeper egalitarian and ecological vision” of
society. Similarly, White (2019:17) argues these visions must be “imagine[d] and built,
fabricated and realized, institutionalized and sustained by public support and ongoing
engagement.” In turn, they suppose more just and ecologically sustainable political, social,
and economic structures will emerge. Baker’s own reconceptualization of energy as a ‘New
Energy Commons’ echoes these approaches, seeking to embed energy production inside
communities, used for collaboratively decided ends (Baker 2017).
Several authors, including Baker, have cited Vermont’s solar policies as models for
more just energy systems (Jones and James 2017; Baker 2017; Stephens et al. 2018), in
line with the ‘prefiguring and prototyping’ approach to just transition. Our findings on
structural barriers in Vermont’s transition indicate the success of such policies may be
overstated. Just as ‘model’ policies like community solar arrangements face structural,
political economic constraints, so too might just transition ‘prototypes and prefigurations.’
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This is not to say justice advocates should abandon them. Instead, policy advocacy
should turn to Wichterich’s (2015:94) notion of “enabling spaces” for such transformative
practices. Here, government power and (thus public policy) works toward “fair distribution
[of wealth and resources]…protection of nature, social reproduction and the public
good…” Yet rather than depending on the state to enact these benefits ‘from above,’
Wichterich’s emphasis is on using the state to neutralize structural constraints which would
otherwise stifle ‘bottom up’ change.
However, Vermont is a small state with a small population. Vermont also imports
most of its energy, thereby implicating it with energy injustice across global supply chains
(Healy et al. 2019). How generalizable, then, are these findings? Rather than evaluate the
‘scalability’ of these Vermont-specific recommendations, which would minimize the
particular, interdeterminate relationships which construct the energy system and political
economy of the case in question (Tsing 2019), we propose the following questions for
energy justice activists and/or policymakers to consider in evaluating other transition
policies: 1) how do systems of provision for transition resources (the confluence of political
economic factors which link consumer choice with the characteristics of production
[Bayliss et al. 2013; Mattioli et al. 2020]) interact with distributive, procedural, and
recognitional justice issues? 2) How do these systems therefore constrain consumer
choices? 3) What political alternatives overcome these constraints and provide enabling
space for collective change? Future research into Vermont’s energy transition should
consider how these questions relate to Vermont’s relationship to international energy
policy, and research into transition policy should consider these questions writ large.
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Abstract:
Vermont is considered as a leader in renewable energy policy. This paper examines
the ideological and political visions in Vermont energy policy discourses, alongside semistructured interviews with key informants (n = 18) to explore how these policies encourage
and/or prevent just transition politics. We first review Vermont’s energy transition policies
and political and ideological assumptions in just transition politics. We then categorize
discourses in policies and interviews to understand ideological and political visions present
in Vermont. This study finds that while there is a marginal overlap with just transition
ideologies, Vermont energy transition discourses largely prevent just transition by
assuming a neoclassical political economic vision. We suggest just transition advocates
could use marginal overlap between their politics and existing policy to advance rhetorical,
socio-ecological claims in official politics. However, further research into what fosters the
small number of existing just transition discourses in Vermont is needed.
1. Introduction
Energy system transitions are core pieces of climate change mitigation and
adaptation. While some countries have national frameworks for transition away from
greenhouse gas (GHG) emitting fuels (e.g. Germany’s Energiewende), the United States
(U.S.) does not. In this absence, a range of its sub-national state governments have
developed energy transition policies, and increasingly these state-level governments look
to one another for policy models (Rabe 2019). Analysis of renewable energy policies in
individual states is therefore a useful way to evaluate energy transitions in the U.S., one of
the highest GHG emitters, overall.
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Yet renewable energy transitions are confrontational and politically charged:
transitions require “alter[ing] technologies, political will, legal regulations, market
dynamics, and social attitudes and values” (Sovacool et al. 2016:311). These changes often
have regressive impacts. Price-based mechanisms, for instance, may disproportionately
harm poor and rural populations. Popular backlash to such mechanisms in France (Nature
Energy Editorial Board 2019) and in Ecuador (BBC News 2019) provide two examples.
Similarly, energy transitions imply the elimination of fossil-fuel industries on which the
livelihoods of energy workers and often the areas in which they live depend. ‘Just
transition’ is a framework for preventing, or at least mitigating, both of these negative
impacts.
Exactly what just transition consists of is contested (Stevis et al. 2020). In the
narrow model, the just transition framework reconciles the ‘jobs-versus-environment’
dilemma (Evans and Phelan 2016) by managing the distributive conflict: who ‘wins’ and
who ‘loses,’ for instance, in phasing out coal (Newell and Mulvaney 2013). Such policy
proposals often provide recompense to workers fired in response to environmental
regulations (e.g. Tcherneva 2018, Eisenberg 2019). But the more comprehensive just
transition model relates not just to particular economic sectors but to political economy and
its entanglements with social injustice (e.g. “Just Transition” accessed 2019; White 2019;
Akuno 2020; Stevis et al. 2020). Proponents of this model argue not just or recompense
but “profound changes in the organization of and relations at work” (Stevis et al. 2020:22).
The extent to which either of these just transition models appears in energy
transition in the U.S. varies, however (Eisenberg 2019). This absence raises “normative
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and instrumental” concerns about the success of its energy transition (Williams and Doyon
2019:144). As an initial contribution to studying just transition in individual state policies,
this research examines in-depth renewable energy policy discourses in Vermont,
considered a leader in the U.S. (Silverman 2017; Stephens et al. 2018). Scholars have
commended Vermont’s energy transition policies for their progress in developing
renewable electricity infrastructure, participatory siting processes (Sovacool et al 2014), as
well as use of group net metering which helps to distribute benefits like electric rate
reductions to non-homeowners (Jones and James 2017; Stephens et al. 2018). Still, little
academic literature exists on just transition politics in Vermont, with implications for
policy success.
We

analyze

discourses,

understood

as

“representations,

construals,

conceptualizations, or theories” of reality (Fairclough 2013:178), to understand the extent
the just transition frame arises in Vermont policy. We focus especially on policy
documents, the discourses in which cast light on both the problems to which policies
respond and the ideological assumptions authors make in their proposals for solving them.
But these realities are of course complex, and policymakers rely on simplified ideological
assumptions to define problems (problematization) and propose solutions (imaginaries) to
‘solve’ them. Discourse analysis therefore provides a window into these imaginaries, or
what we call “visions,” based on how policy ‘solutions’ define (represent, construe,
conceptualize or theorize) social problems.
Here, we analyze Vermont energy transition’s guiding policies to see how their
visions align with just transition principles. We conduct a discourse analysis of formal
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planning documents, as well semi-structured interviews with key informants about energy
policy, asking: how do Vermont’s transition policy discourses encourage or prevent just
transition? Below we provide a theoretical background on just transition and the renewable
energy transition policies initiated in Vermont followed by methods and results of the
study.
2. Background
2.1 Discourses, Problematizations, and Visions
In researching the relationship between Vermont energy policy and just transition,
we draw heavily from the Fairclough’s discourse analysis framework (2013). This
approach first assumes that policies are simultaneously attempts to define problems and
propose solutions (Fairclough 2013:192). Yet because “social reality” (Fairclough
2013:178) is so complex, defining any such problem, or “problematization” (Fairclough
2013:185), is a subjective process. Policymakers therefore rely on “political judgement”
(Rittel and Weber 1976:161) in the process. Fairclough argues that this political judgement
consists of ideological “imaginaries” (2013:192), i.e. policymakers’ subjective
understandings of “social reality,” its problems, and what they would like to do about them.
Thus, in this framework, discourses construe both policymakers’ subjective
problematizations and accordingly, the ideological imaginaries, or what we call visions, on
which those problematizations are based.
Fairclough also argues that the discourse from “social actors” of all sorts – from
policymakers in power to “lay” people (Fairclough 2013:186) – also includes
problematizations and visions. Fairclough argues that because discourse is reflexive (it
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simultaneously shapes and is shaped by social reality) both discourses within policies and
ordinary discourses from people responding to these policies are important. With regard to
non-policy discourses, discourse analysis is especially useful for evaluating how
individuals “problematize problematizations” which originally appear in policy, and how
they propose alternative visions in response (Fairclough 2013:193).
2.2 Just Transition Problematization and Vision
Just transition discourses vary between a narrow vision focused on individual
industries and a broad vision focused on political economy. For example, Heffron and
colleagues’ (narrow) definition requires “the benefits and disbenefits of the transition are
distributed through a fair and equitable process among all members of society” (2020:8)
while Stevis and colleagues’ broad vision claims that “without profound changes in the
organization of and relations at work a just, inclusive, and transformative
socioenvironmental transition is impossible.” (2020:22). While the narrow field’s attention
to distributional justice for workers and nearby communities (Jenkins et al. 2020) is critical,
we believe they depend on an inappropriate separation between politics, economics, and
environmental concerns. The broader just transition field focuses on the interdependence
of these factors, drawing from frameworks in which social structures and economics are
embedded in non-human nature (e.g. Brown 2016) and environmental problems originate
from social inequalities (Bookchin 1980; Salleh 2009).
We use “just transition” to refer to the broader field, defined by its problematization
of the energy transition as a need to remake the size, purposes, and power relationships of
economic production. It holds the tenets that 1) political economies have uneven
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distributions of power (e.g. Newell and Mulvaney 2013); 2) the dominant modes of
economic production are unsustainable and require “proactive transformation” (White
2019); and 3) energy and energy systems are core components of these modes of economic
production and changing them disproportionately harms disadvantaged people within
political economic systems (Sovacool et al. 2017; Lennon 2017).
Importantly, this understanding does not reduce political and social relationships to
economics alone. It aligns instead with Fraser’s Marxian definition of capitalism as an
“institutionalized social order” (Fraser and Jaeggi 2018:166). By this, Fraser means that
economic production depends on not only on labor exploitation but also upon “axes of
injustice” (Fraser and Jaeggi 2018:177). These include social and natural exploitation (e.g.
gender inequality and social reproduction, racial oppression and expropriation, and the
need to pollute and disrupt land for fueling growth and depositing waste) (Fraser 2014).
Fraser’s point is not that these relationships are purely functional to capitalism or originated
with it, but that they are all interconnected (“imbricated”) (Fraser and Jaeggi 2018:19).
Accordingly, action towards ‘economic’ justice in energy transitions must necessarily
overlap with and work for justice in other social relationships – gender, racial, and
environmental. Just transition discourses often refer to ‘workers and frontline
communities’ as a shorthand for the disadvantaged people and groups. The term “does not
mean essentializing workers by overstating their role,or placing them above other[s]”
(Stevis et al. 2020:21). Instead, support for ‘workers and frontline communities’ implies
support for a broad view of environmental justice which is multiscalar (Pellow 2017; Sze
2020), ranging from the sites of energy extraction to individual energy uses.
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The vision this problematization construes aligns with Wichterich’s (2015:83)
There Are Many Alternatives (TAMA) framework in which people resist and unmake
injustices “with multiple strategies” starting from where they are with the conditions in
front of them (Harcourt and Nelson 2015:10). For instance, Cooperation Jackson, an
organization in Jackson, Mississippi in the U.S. working for sustainability, economic
democracy, and community ownership, employs a “build and fight” strategy for achieving
just transition. The organization works to ‘build’ (prefigure) a just transition through
construction of a ‘solidarity economy’ of worker-owned cooperatives focused on
environmental sustainability (Akuno 2020). Their efforts extend into official politics too,
‘fighting’ for policies which support their efforts (Akuno 2020:106). The organization’s
Just Transition plan, for instance, calls for “expanded and sustainable public
transportation” (Cooperation Jackson 2015) strengthening the flow of people and goods
throughout the solidarity economy (and beyond) and decreasing fossil fueled transportation
emissions. These actions stem from a desire to “work within [official] political space, not
to be a part of it, but rather to create the conditions…we need” (Akuno 2020:108). The
vision of the just transition discourse is thus one of strengthening political conditions to
create “enabling spaces” (Wichterich 2015:92) in which ‘many alternatives’ can thrive and
in which ‘workers and frontline communities’ unmake axes of injustice by their own
initiative.
The end goal might be thought of as a democratized political economy in which
people can pose and answer normative questions about the purpose of their energy and
economies: “energy for what? And to sustain what kinds of modes of life?” (White
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2019:14). The upshot should not be that just transition is unrealistic or unwieldy, but that
a neat, packaged just transition policy will be insufficient and overly simplistic. Better
approaches would be policies which target specific conditions preventing worker and
frontline community initiatives – including the narrow just transition’s proposals– but
understanding these as enabling, not causing, larger changes in political economic
conditions. We propose that just transition themes in policy discourse relate to 1) mitigating
distributive conflict in energy transitions and recognizing power imbalances; 2) recognition
of political economy’s connection to “axes of injustice” in the creation of these power
imbalances; and 3) support for efforts of “workers and frontline communities” to prefigure
just and sustainable “modes of life”.
2.3 Overview of Vermont Energy Systems and Transition Policy
Although the Vermont government has had renewable energy policies since the late
20th century, the Department of Public Service’s 2011 and 2016 Comprehensive Energy
Plans (CEPs) provide the overarching vision, goals, and plans for the transition. In broadest
terms, these goals amount to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions across all sectors
by 90% by the year 2050 (VDPS 2016). These plans built off previous pricing incentives
encouraging the development of in-state renewable electricity generators (DSIRE 2015;
VDPS 2020d). The two CEPs culminated in legislation establishing a Renewable Energy
Standard, which requires electricity utilities to provide increasing quotas of renewably
generated electricity, as well as investments in “energy transformation” in other sectors,
e.g. electric transportation infrastructure, annually (VDPS 2020c).
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Vermont residents consume more energy than is produced in the state, nearly all of
which is electricity (U.S. Energy Information Association 2020). The state imports largely
petroleum, oil, and natural gas for automotive transport (40% of energy consumed) and
building heating (46% of energy consumed) (Energy Action Network 2019). The
remaining 14% of energy consumed relates to electricity. Although 99% of electricity
generated in Vermont is from renewable sources (USEIA 2020), producers sell much of it
to be consumed out-of-state (VDPS 2016). In terms of electricity consumed in-state, 62%
is renewable, but half of this stems from generators located in the neighboring Canadian
province of Quebec (EAN 2019:13; VDPS 2016:235). In total only 24% of energy
consumed across all sectors is renewable (EAN 2019).
These gains come largely from changes in electricity procurement, a core focus of
both CEPs. As transportation and building heating make up 86% of Vermont’s energy
footprint, however, the 2016 CEP increased attention on these sectors. The latter depends
on efficiency gains (e.g. weatherization) and depends heavily on the state’s pre-existing
“energy efficiency utilities” (EEUs) for loans and rebates to consumers (VDPS 2020a).
Transportation, however, depends largely on technological upgrades, particularly the
proliferation of electric vehicles (EAN 2018; EAN 2019). Various state programs,
including from utilities complying with the RES, incentivize consumer purchases of
electric or hybrid vehicles, much the same as they incentivize efficiency upgrades (Drive
Electric VT 2020). Yet few studies have addressed questions of justice and energy policy
in Vermont, except for in terms of energy pricing (Mittlefehlt and Tedford 2014; TellerElsberg et al. 2016). Below, we analyze discourses in the 2011 and 2016 CEPs to evaluate
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how their problematizations and visions relate to those of just transitions, alongside
discourses from interviews with key informants.
3. Methods and Materials:
To examine energy policy discourse’s connections to just transition politics, this
paper uses discourse analysis. We compare discourses in the most recent State of Vermont
Comprehensive Energy Plans and those present in discourses from interviews discussing
these policies. We then compare the problematizations and visions in these discourses
against the just transition’s, asking: how do Vermont’s renewable energy policies
encourage and/or prevent just transition? All study protocols were approved by the
University of Vermont Institutional Review Board.
3.1 Datasets
The principle policy documents were the 2011 and 2016 Comprehensive Energy
Plans published by the Vermont Department of Public Service. As the 2016 plan is an
update of the 2011 version, the former constituted the bulk of our attention. We also
examined other public discourses among key informants by conducting semi-structured
interviews conducted as a part of the REJOICE (Rural Environmental Justice
Opportunities Informed by Community Expertise) project (Panikkar et al. forthcoming).
REJOICE is a Vermont-based partnership between the Center for Whole Communities,
Community Action Works, and practitioners from Vermont Law School and the
University of Vermont (including myself). The partnership has a mission to explore and
address environmental justice issues – broadly defined– in Vermont through research,
community organizing, and policy development. Although the findings and analysis of
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this paper stem from this dataset, they do not represent official positions of the REJOICE
Partnership, nor complete portrayals of its work.
3.2 Interview Design and Recruitment:
The authors with three other researchers traveled across Vermont and conducted
semi-structured interviews with local social, environmental, and health experts (n=50)
between July and August of 2019. Interviewees were recruited using internet searches for
organizations in the area, REJOICE partners’ professional networks, and from snowball
sampling (Heckathorn 1997). Our interview approach was semi-structured and respondent
driven, so questions varied. This paper draws from 18 of these interviews in which energy
was a core topic. The key informants included state officials, community association
members, social workers, labor advocates, and policy advocates.
3.3 Coding and Discourse Identification:
We employed a qualitative coding approach to this dataset. With a team of research
assistants, we conducted a thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke 2006) of the interview
transcripts, using a priori codes developed from the basic REJOICE research areas (e.g.
Climate, Energy, Housing, Pollution, Transportation, etc.) The team used the qualitative
software NVivo v.12 (QSR International) for analysis. Following categorization, we
developed inductive subcodes (Maguire and Delahunt 2017) relating to energy politics. For
instance, when interviewees discussed low-income households’ difficulties purchasing
heating fuel, we marked this as “flaws of current energy system.” Simultaneously, we
began coding the Comprehensive Energy Plan policy documents, again using inductive
coding. For instance, when the 2016 Comprehensive Energy Plan discussed “modernizing”
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Vermont’s electrical grid, we coded this text as “technology-based change”. Once texts
were organized, we searched for discursive statements with ideological or political
implications. For instance, when the 2016 CEP described renewable energy as a set of
“opportunities” we coded this as “win-win-win” discourse in which policymakers framed
the energy transition as shared prosperity rather than politicized, confrontational change in
political economy.
3.4 Author Positionalities
We hold that our positionalities are influential components of research design and
interpretation (Haraway 1988). The study authors share a position as academic researchers
at University of Vermont, which, alongside other issue experts in the REJOICE
Partnership, steered topics of investigation and recruitment scripts towards environmental
justice issues we assumed may prevail in Vermont. These assumptions may have
unintentionally pulled our attention away from atypical or uncommon environmental
justice concerns. Similarly, the materials used to recruit participants may have
unintentionally favored people comfortable with our positionalities and marginalized
others.
These limitations may have interacted with the first author’s positionalities (as a
white man of financial security with a limited residency in Vermont) to establish distance
between this author’s analysis and the positionalities of people usually subjected to
environmental injustice. This analysis may therefore diminish the needs of “women and
other invisibile groups” (Rocheleau 1995) notably people of color, in Vermont. As
discussed in Keady et al. (Forthcoming), we therefore consider the issues in this anlaysis
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important but incomplete, unable to fully encompass Fraser’s axes of injustice in political
economy.
4. Results and Discussion
Below, we analyze discourses in the Comprehensive Energy Plan to identify the
dominant policy ‘vision’ of Vermont’s energy transition. We then categorize three sets of
discourses present in interviews, elucidating their problematizations and visions as well.
Finally, we compare each of these visions against one another to understand how policy
discourse and interview discourse create a general ideological vision of the energy
transition in Vermont. We then compare this against the vision of the just transition
framework to determine areas of overlap.

4.1 Comprehensive Energy Plan Problematization and Vision
The 2011 Comprehensive Energy Plan provides four objectives: “[f]oster economic
security and independence; [s]afeguard our environment; [d]rive in-state innovation and
jobs creation; and [i]ncrease community involvement and investment. (VDPS 2011:3). By
2016, these objectives evolved into a “moral and economic” imperative (VDPS 2016:4)
for pursuing “energy security and environmental benefit” (VDPS 2016:1). The purpose of
both documents appears as economic development, thought to create growth in a “triple
bottom line” of “people, planet, and profits” (Slaper and Hall 2011). In the CEP’s terms,
the triple bottom line is described as energy policy “not for its own sake but as a tool to
advance economic, environmental, and health objectives” (VDPS 2016:2).
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The plans respond to a three-part problematization: 1) unsatisfactory economic
growth and independence (e.g. “Vermont’s dependence on oil” imported from abroad
[VDPS 2011:3]); a moral desire to connect the environment writ large with economic
opportunity (“we will help not only our environment but also the Vermont brand – which
underpins our tourism and agricultural industries and attracts businesses” [VDPS
2011:4]).; a need for shared and holistic prosperity which comes from realizing “societal
values in our energy decisions” (VDPS 2016:59).
This problematization construes an ideological vision of the ‘Energy Future,’ in
which the energy transition as a grandiose force capable of achieving a variety of social
‘goods’: economic security, environmental sustainability, and public health. As a response
to “moral imperative,” the plans imply that environmental threats are ethical failings in
which people are uniformly responsible, vulnerable, and likely to benefit from mitigation.
In need of safeguarding, for instance, are the “[f]lat, sunny, open lands…that may serve as
important habitats for…the biodiversity that supports us all” (VDPS 2016:59). This
narrative contrasts with environmental justice concerns, for instance, ignoring any
particular place-based concerns which may be unequally distributed across social groups
(e.g. Agyeman et al. 2016).
Similarly, conflict over environmental decision-making is conveyed as a difficult
but dignified process of respectful exchange. Mutual agreement emerges in this arena
through moral commitment to the greater good: “The uses and values we impart to our
lands and waters may seem to be in stark competition with each other… [but] we can
find…acceptable compromises if we are up to the challenge” (VDPS 2016:59). This vision
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of a cohesive society with universal values relating to the environment may stem from the
assumptions that economic production and consumption occur without conflict, and occur
as exchanges between individuals that are equally powerful. In other words, the Energy
Future makes neoclassical economic assumptions in which “the exchange of a fixed
collection of goods among individuals bargaining directly with one another [and] no further
trading will make one person better off without making someone else worse off” (Gowdy
2010:2). This commitment appears most strongly in the quote:
“Individual decisions — about where to live, what car to buy (or whether to
buy a car at all), what appliances to buy, whether and how to weatherize
your home or invest in renewable energy — will have a significant impact…
While public policy has affected and will continue to affect these
choices…they are fundamentally private decisions.” (VDPS 2016:8)
This understanding presents a neoliberal approach climate mitigation: careful,
ethical behavior by individuals, rather than collective action (Parr 2015). Rather than
recognizing workers and frontline communities as agents of change based on axes of
injustice, this vision assumes individuals are already equal. The CEPs therefore echo MultiLevel-Perspective (MLP) frameworks (Geels 2005; Eames and Hunt 2013; Sengers et al.
2019). According to these fields, energy systems are complex, socio-technical
arrangements made up on one level of individual interactions, another by rules, policies,
and technologies which shape those interactions, and a third by overall system ‘paradigms,’
which are the prevailing character of the systems themselves (e.g. a ‘fossil fuel’ paradigm
vs a ‘renewable energy’ one). MLP policy’s primary purpose is to tweak rules and policies
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on the second level, often using technocratic measures like economic and behavioral
modeling, to change individual behaviors. These individual changes are meant to aggregate
into systemic shifts into new paradigms (Eames and Hunt 2013). Although this approach
depends on some policy ‘management’ of the marketplace, the emphasis on the changing
the contexts of individual decisions directly echoes the neoclassical economic theory of
individual exchange that leads to societally ‘optimal’ ends.
The CEP policy vision is primarily focused establishing new, private, economic
decisions in which economic and environmental ‘benefits’ arise as byproducts. For
instance, with respect to thermal energy emissions reduction, the CEPs point heavily to
“build[ing] the industry” (VDPS 2016:107) for provisioning thermal energy efficiency
services. The industry is thought to create “a vibrant and equitable economy” (VDPS
2016:3) by providing money-making opportunities for “heating service companies,
building performance contractors, and renewable energy installers” (VDPS 2016:7), and
“creating well-paying jobs in [these] industries” (VDPS 2016:3). As aftereffects, this
industry reduces the amount of fossil fuel energy consumed in thermal heating and
contributes to societal health by “yielding better respiratory, psychological, and overall
health” to customers receiving thermal efficiency services (VDPS 2016:27). The solution
to any “real world shortcomings” of such market-based policies (e.g. split incentives
between landlords and tenants) is to double-down on markets, pursuing policies that
“enhance markets by providing information, technical assistance, or access to capital”
(VDPS 2016:53) instead.
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Discourses thus construe the Energy Future as a win-win-win vision in which what
is good for business is good for human and environmental health. While this approach to
energy policy is common, Moussu (2020:70) indicates that “conflicts and trade-offs
between objectives are hidden… key political economy questions…are avoided [and]
difficult questions such as who will finance and bear the costs of the transition towards a
low-carbon economy remain unanswered". In such a vision, the defining feature of the
Energy Future is the energy itself. Political, social, and economic arrangements remain
largely untouched, except to the extent that they must change to accept different energy
sources (e.g. the ‘new utility model’). That which ushers in the grandiose vision is a change
in the fuel alone, not the social systems it powers. Accordingly, the explicit goals and
benchmarks which the CEPs hope to achieve have to do largely with emissions as the end
results of political economic activity. In this way, the vision preserves the character of the
activities producing them.
4.2 Interview discourses
4.2.1 Land Use Discourses
Overwhelmingly, interview discourses related to renewable energy siting and land
use. Three separate themes emerged within these discourses: aesthetic and proprietary
concerns, environmental efficiency concerns, and eco-centric concerns.
Aesthetic and proprietary discourses claimed renewable infrastructure (usually
solar or wind farms) were non-aesthetic or anomalies within the landscape. They expressed
disapproval of infrastructure because of its impacts on property investments: “everyone's
always afraid that it's going to ruin their view, and it's going to be insurmountably ruining
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their property values” (Interview 11). The chief concern appeared to be the proximity of
infrastructure, not the infrastructure itself: “we’re not against solar, we’re against where
they’re wanting to put it. There are places to put it where it’s not an eyesore” (Interview
1). The problematization and vision are both narrow: renewable energy infrastructure is
non-aesthetic, and should therefore be sited away from residences or scenic landscapes.
Environmental efficiency discourses lamented that siting criteria (or lack thereof)
developed energy infrastructure away from more environmentally beneficial places:
“The one place we really should be putting [solar panels] up…is over every
parking lot, that it shades your cars…and that’s thoroughly disturbed land
already” (Interview 3).
“we’re producing massive amounts of power right on our roof top. Which
is an ideal situation, because we’re not cutting down trees, we’re not taking
up green” (Interview 5).
Like the aesthetic or proprietary vision, these discourses problematize the CEPs
siting decisions. However, their concern was not proximity but environmental and planning
criteria used to make decisions. They envisioned siting decisions made based on the
reconciliation of GHG mitigation with other environmental concerns such as wildlife
corridor preservation or stormwater runoff reduction.
Eco-centric discourses construed a vision of the natural world as “untouched,
edenic locales” preserved “as sacred” (Hultgren 2018:56), in which renewable energy
infrastructure was immoral and unacceptable. Advocates posited such locales (“a pristine
mountain in the middle of nowhere” [Interview 7]) as immorally targeted for unmitigated
82

destruction “you get…close to 500ft [wind] towers up there [on mountain ridgelines],
tremendous desecration up there” (Interview 9).They conveyed a vision of non-human
nature as imperiled and intrinsically valuable, imagined as entirely distinct from human
society and important to keep that way. The eco-centric vision appeared in which society
and nature are neatly separated and the ‘value’ of nature is intrinsic, incomparable to the
benefits of any social, economic, or political project.
4.2.2 Egalitarian Discourses:
A second set of discourses problematized policy’s social impacts, arguing that the
benefits and burdens were unequally distributed. For instance, access to solar net metering,
and the reduced electricity rates accompanying it, was repeatedly described as available
only to wealthy homeowners:
“getting solar installed is expensive…if you own, solar might be an option.
But as a renter, solar’s not an option” (Interview 5).
There were also concerns over uneven regressive impacts from a hypothetical state-based
‘carbon tax,’ mentioned as a potential policy in the 2016 CEP (VDPS 2016:53).
“If we go forward with the carbon tax, we’ll [northeastern Vermont] be
disproportionately impacted because we’re rural and spread out” (Interview
7).
Relatedly, interviewees doubted that policies generated shared prosperity, claiming
renewable energy developers and non-residents were policy’s primary beneficiaries. Asked
who benefited from solar energy infrastructure construction, one interviewee reported
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“well I'm sure their [utility companies’] shareholders are seeing a benefit”
(Interview 5).
“because of our poverty levels…we’ve had some of the biggest wind
programs in the state. We have really poor towns that, if you’re going to
guarantee an income stream [for the town] you have people that are like
‘Yes! Bring it’” (Interview 7).
Unlike land-use problematizations, however, egalitarian discourses, appealed to
universal, rather personal or environmental concerns in discussing siting. These discourses
primarily problematize the CEPs’ assumptions that their policies will establish equally
optimal outcomes. Still, they convey a range of ideological visions. By focusing on
distribution of benefits, burdens, and opportunities, they overlap some with the Energy
Future vision and its concern with the inputs or outcomes of economic processes
(regressive taxes, uneven access to benefits) rather than the processes themselves.
Presumably, egalitarian visions could entail the same MLP framework as the Energy
Future, simply with altered management decisions. In general, the visions appealed to
procedure, calling for “consolidation of who gets to decide what our land use patterns are
and who benefits from our land use patterns” (Interview 8).
4.2.3 Socio-ecological Discourses
A third set of discourses criticized the energy policy as a “green veneer” (Interview
6) or “marketing scheme” (Interview 4). Interviewees drew these conclusions based on a
socio-ecological problematization, that is “a politics that recognizes the intense
interconnections between the natural and social realms” (Hultgren 2018:71). In this
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perspective, the vision of the Energy Future cannot meaningfully address ‘environmental
problems’ because of a failure to understand their origins in intertwined political, social,
and economic relationships: “I think the main environmental problem is capitalism and
imperialism, [which] looks like settler colonialism here…also patriarchy…propped up
through white supremacy” (Interview 2).
As with just transition, socio-ecological discourses problematized the need for
energy transition as “a symptom of a way of organizing society” (Interview 2). From this
lens, energy transition policies focusing on emerging technologies or increasing alternative
energy sources ignore root problems. A central example was transition policy’s reliance on
“imported [renewable energy] resources (particularly from Hydro-Quebec)” (VDPS
2016:235). Interviewees problematized this reliance as bringing in solutions from outside,
rather than addressing the means and ends of energy use within Vermont:
“The state [is] kind of in a quandary because the whole system is based on
extraction” (Interview 2).
In this view, the CEP wrongly imports energy as opposed to “changing the way we
use energy” (Interview 4) to meet supply. Interviewees claimed the import of energy, in
turn, implicates Vermont in injustices associated with extraction of natural gas and
hydroelectricity from First Nations territories in Canada (Massell 2016; LeQuesne 2019).
These discourses construe a vision that integrates energy concerns with other
matters of human livelihood. Interviewees claimed their intention was “to build a mass
movement around issues that relate to an energy transition it needs to be sort of woven into
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a broader vision for a better society” (Interview 2). Their preferred target of energy policy
in other words would be social structures and processes, not individuals within them.
4.3 Comparison of Energy Policy, Interview, and Just Transition Visions
Though each set of discourses challenged the Energy Future vision, we argue that
none except the eco-centrist and socio-ecological visions breaks with the Energy Future
entirely. Largely, the aesthetic/proprietary, environmental efficiency, and egalitarian
visions can be understood simply as advocating for changes in the model parameters or
management criteria used in the Energy Future’s Multi-Level Perspective framework.
Aesthetic and proprietary visions for instance may be satisfied by new energy siting criteria
which relocate infrastructure away from real estate. The same would be true for
environmental efficiency visions, focusing instead on the inclusion of ecological factors
like carbon sequestration in land-use decisions. Egalitarian visions could be satisfied with
parameters that promote equal opportunity and distributive justice, for instance, increasing
government subsidies for loans for home weatherization.
Thus the Energy Future vision, and the majority of interview discourses, align only
marginally with the just transition vision. The just transition problematization (the need to
remake or unmake the size, purposes, and power relationships of economic production)
breaks radically from that of the CEP (economic development bent towards a “triple bottom
line.”) Similarly, the Energy Future vision replaces just transition’s agents of change
(‘workers and frontline communities’) with energy itself. It ignores the just transition’s
vision of democratization and remaking of the purposes and ends of energy itself. The
Energy Future discourses also fail to align with just transition by ignoring “axes of
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injustice” and “ways of ordering society,” instead making the neoclassical economic
assumption that individuals acting in their own best interests will achieve shared economic
and environmental benefit. In short, rather than a vision of reorganization of and relations
at work (Stevis et al. 2020) the Energy Future envisions a repurposing of them based on a
moral commitment to environmental protection. Rather than fostering “enabling spaces”
for “worker and frontline community” political or economic projects, the Energy Future
vision assumes there is space enough already within the current political economy.
By contrast, the socio-ecological discourses overlap neatly with just transition
discourses. The overlap starts with rejecting the problematization that energy decisions are
“fundamentally private,” and between equals in the marketplace, a perspective which
cannot reconcile with socio-ecological vision’s criticism of systemic social injustices.
Instead, the socio-ecological vision understands “safeguarding the environment” as a
political problem requiring collective action toward new ways of “ordering society.” In this
way, the socio-ecological transition is nearly identical to just transition discourses,
imagining the unmaking of prevailing systems (e.g. capitalism, patriarchy, racism, settler
colonialism) as part of this new ordering.
Lastly, the eco-centric vision breaks with both Energy Future and just transition
discourses. As eco-centric discourses rest on an idea of nature as fundamentally distinct
from society (Bookchin 1996; Hultgren 2018), they cannot accept the incorporation of
wilderness into sociotechnical energy systems in the first place, regardless of whether this
incorporation is for low-carbon energy. Further, any resulting conflict is not a matter for
public deliberation as in the Energy Future (VDPS 2016) nor is it a matter of “build[ing]
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and fight[ing]” (Akuno 2020) as in the just transition. Instead, eco-centric discourses
describe it as a cultural concern: “I don't care if you could put wind turbines and solar
farms everywhere, …we have a culture that is dependent on consumption and destruction”
(Interview 9). This call for cultural changes overlaps slightly with the “moral imperative”
in the CEPs, but the eco-centric moral vision would be better characterized as societal
retreat ‘from nature’ as opposed to integrating natural well-being into economic
development. They also break with the just transition vision, which would find
‘consumption’ conditioned more by axes of injustice in which people operate rather than
cultural choices.
Altogether, these comparisons suggest that Vermont energy policies and
individuals discussing them largely ignore just transition political ideas, and the dominance
of the Energy Future discursive frame constrains their emergence. This disconnect places
severe constraints on the potential for just transition politics to emerge. While unsurprising
for a formal policy document, the CEPs’ repeated references to “what we do” to protect
“our environment” ignore longstanding findings from the environmental and energy justice
fields showing disproportionate access to environmental and energy benefits and exposure
to hazards along racial, gender, and class lines (e.g. Agyeman et al. 2016; Lennon 2016;
Pellow 2017; Sze 2020). In doing so, CEP discourses gloss over social conflicts and
political economic questions, hiding potential motives for collective action towards
enacting or envisioning alternative “modes of life” (White 2019:14).
Still, by framing interview questions in terms of ‘Vermont energy policy,’ this
research may have unintentionally conditioned interviewees to speak only within CEP’s
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discursive frame. Moreover, because interview recruitment methods drew heavily from
environmental justice, they prioritized ‘frontline community’ members over typical
‘workers’ such as labor union members. With low participation from a core constituency
of just transition politics (Snell 2020), these interviews may thus have misrepresented the
overall character of energy discourse in the state.
4. Conclusion
The just transition vision we have characterized requires an unmaking of structural
social inequalities along various lines, and involves the ability to realize societal values not
through the marketplace but through purposeful, democratic changes in the “organization
of and relations at work,” broadly understood as an “imbricated” institutionalized social
order. Since the conclusion of interviews, new legislative proposals emerged in this vein.
These include H.868 (Cina 2020), calling for “a just transition from an extractive economy”
and S.311 (Pollina 2020) proposing progressive taxation to fund “weatherization, thermal
efficiency, public transportation, renewable heating systems, and the use of electric
vehicles.” The presence of these principles in formal policymaking will perhaps influence
the overall discourse and politics in Vermont. But as policies for climate mitigation and
adaption become increasingly urgent, just transition policy advocates may find Vermont’s
model as cause for concern. Our analysis has interpreted a general lack of engagement with
just transition discourses or visions in the guiding documents for its energy transition.
Interpretation suggests that Vermont’s transition policies make neoclassical economic
assumptions of behavior, arguing decisions about energy are “fundamentally private.” In
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turn, they downplay social, political, and economic conflicts which are by contrast central
to the just transition framework.
Future research should examine the political and economic conditions which have
led the Energy Future discourse and vision to prevail in Vermont. Such research may
benefit from attention to political boundaries in energy extraction and use. Unlike other
localities where ‘just transition’ discourses are more prevalent e.g. the Latrobe Valley in
Australia (Evans and Phelan 2016; Snell 2020), there is little energy production or
extraction within Vermont (EIA 2020), perhaps explaining the heavy attention on new
infrastructure. Yet socio-ecological visions extended beyond Vermont’s borders to sites of
extraction in their visions of justice (Healy et al. 2019). An examination of how and why
such multiscalar perspectives emerges, and whether this perspective is linked to furthering
just transition politics, may be fruitful. This sort of analysis would be particularly useful in
translating lessons from Vermont to other localities where energy transition policies are
under consideration.
Future research should also consider the areas of rhetorical overlap between the
Energy Future, egalitarian, and just transition visions. In a shallow sense the Energy
Future’s joining of environmental, economic, and health concerns together relates to an
interrelationship between society and environment, squaring with a ‘socio-ecological’
visions. So too does the vision of the egalitarian discourse with its emphasis on fairness.
Indeed, the presence of socio-ecological discourses are proof of the potential for
proliferation of just transition discourses despite discursive constraints. Engaging at this
rhetorical level may provide space for just transition discourses in formal political contexts.
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Though a far cry from “enabling spaces” for full on just transition politics, exploiting and
extending the existing rhetorical overlap in discourses may still be a useful political
strategy from which to create these conditions.
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